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Short summary
This research comes from the desire to investigate in depth banking in-
stitutions from different angles perspectives: from the inside, exploring their
internal characteristics (Corporate Governance as well as business models) and
from the outside, by also considering how they are perceived by supervisors
and investors.
Therefore, this work is composed by the 3 papers outlined below.
1. The big bank theory: into the bank Corporate Governance liter-
ature
Abstract: "Alongside adequate capital and organization, the third factor
of the stability of the banking system is the quality of Corporate Governance"
(Draghi, 2008).
Corporate Governance of banks is not only important it also unique (Levine,
2004). Sound bank Corporate Governance is a crucial element for promoting a
more resilient financial system (FSB, 2013) and sustaining economic growth
(Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2015).
A systematic literature review is conducted on a sample of articles published
on peer-reviewed academic journals. Balancing theoretical and empirical contri-
butions, findings show that academic research on bank Corporate Governance
is mainly focused on risks potentially faced by banks and their performance
capabilities.
This paper examines the developments of bank Corporate Governance
literature and tries to shed some light on the causality dilemma between the-
ory and practice, by investigating whether or not the progress of regulation
and supervision in the area of bank governance follows academic findings or
viceversa.
vMethodology: systematic literature review, content analysis
Results: the main findings of this paper lead to assert that there is an
increasing understanding of the fundamentals of bank Corporate Governance
such as board structure, committees, risk management, and ownership struc-
ture. This result stands out from both banking and institutional perspective.
Indeed, authorities have developed several measures with the aim of strength-
ening risk management regulation, and assessing the accuracy and usefulness
of information provided to and from banks’ directors also by engaging more
frequently with board and management.
Conclusion: standard setters and regulators tend to focus respectively
on what the board should do and must do and the necessary competences
of board members as opposed to structural characteristics (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision, 2010; FSB, 2013; Directive 2013/36/EU or CRD IV;
Bank of Italy, 2008) (Brogi, 2011).
Nonetheless, there is still a lot of work to do to implement sound Corpo-
rate Governance. This paper examines the developments of bank Corporate
Governance literature trying to shed some light on the causality dilemma
between theory and practice, by investigating whether or not the progress of
regulation and supervision in the area of bank governance follows academic
findings or viceversa. There is a long term supervisory perspective resulted by
the investigation of the literature the purpose of banks’ Corporate Governance
is less to safeguard shareholders and investors, but to safeguard depositors and
other debt holders.
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2. Better safe than sorry. Will the single rulebook on bank
Corporate Governance prevent excessive risk taking?
Abstract: conventional wisdom leads to assert that good governance may
underpin bank performance while bad governance destroys stability/soundness.
Moreover, strong externalities on the economy make bank Corporate Gover-
nance a fundamental issue. The European Commission pursued a number of
initiatives to create a safer and sounder financial sector for the single market
and to restore confidence in banks.
This set of rules is intended to build a single rulebook for financial inter-
mediaries in the EU28. It is based on a three-pronged approach: prudential
requirements for banks (Capital Requirements Directive/Regulation); pre-
vention and management of bank failures (Bank Recovery and Resolution
Directive); deposit insurance (to be completed).
In particular, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) imposing in
addition to stricter capital requirements, introduces new Corporate Governance
and remuneration rules. Bank board characteristics are a crucial factors in
bank risk-taking (Rachdi et al., 2013), thus the qualitative and quantitative
composition of the board imposed by the new regulatory framework is aimed
at preventing/curbing excessive risk-taking. This calls for an in-depth investi-
gation of the Corporate Governance composition of European banks after the
introduction of the new single rulebook, in order to fully understand if and
how it fills the pre-crisis regulatory gaps.
Methodology: factor analysis, multivariate regression analysis
Results: rules come when failures occur.
Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner
in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to economic health
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(BCBS, 2015). As a result, soundness of bank Corporate Governance is a
crucial element not only for promoting a more resilient financial system (FSB,
2013) but also for sustaining economic growth (OECD, 2004; 2015).
Moreover, shortcomings in the governance of banks can result in the trans-
mission of problems across the banking system and, if widespread, can destabi-
lize the financial system (Levine, 2004; OECD, 2006; BCBS, 2015, EU, 2013).
The recent financial crisis that started in 2007 and plagued the economy until
the recent years, can be considered as "a wake-up call" and highlighted that
insufficient attention was paid to bank governance (Ahrens et al., 2011; Adams
and Mehran, 2012). Indeed, both academics and practitioners claim that short-
comings in bank governance may have played a central role in the development
of the crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Adams, 2012;
Aebi et al., 2012; Al-Sa-eed, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; EC, 2013). The current
Regulation calls for Boards of Directors and Committees that prevent the
undertaking of excessive risk by financial institutions.
As a matter of fact, Regulation may impact on financial risk taking by
financial intermediaries by way of the decision-making process envisaged in
the various possible legal structures set forth by the law (Brogi, 2009).
The literature review preliminarily conducted shows that even though
policy makers attribute increasing importance to Corporate Governance, and
there is a growing set of rules that are going to be implemented in the next
years, there seems to be mixed evidence on the relation between board size
and composition and performance in empirical analysis.
We would expect that our results lead us to assess whether or not Corporate
Governance needs to be deeply regulated and which are the most relevant
Corporate Governance characteristics that may have impact on bank risk.
Conclusion: actually, it seems that Corporate Governance characteristics
exert impact on bank risking but governance structures differ systematically
viii
across countries. The well-known rule that there is not a "one size fits all model",
should teach that banks Corporate Governance regulations must be tailor-
made, toward creating sound incentives for banks stakeholders. Nonetheless,
Corporate Governance is not important itself, but to the extent in which it
prevents excessive bank risk taking and improves performance.
Moreover, running after the harmonization of national regulations across
economies with very different governance structures may have restrictive effect
on the scope of the business judgement rule.
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3. Are banks finding their feet? Cluster analysis of banks’ busi-
ness model
Abstract: Business Model Assessment (BMA) is on the top of the agenda
of regulators. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between
banks’ business models and both viability and sustainability, as intended by
the European Banking Authority (EBA) in 2014. Business models are iden-
tified with a cluster analysis based on assets and funding structure of banks’
balance sheets as well as the income diversification. The sample of analysis
is composed by the 30 Euro area banks listed on the Eurostoxx banks index.
Policy implications are also commented.
Methodology: cluster analysis, Capital Asset Pricing Model, multivariate
regression analysis
Results: a decline in total assets was registered by more than half of
sample banks (18) in the period of observation. Almost all, with the exception
of Natixis, decreased total assets in the second sub-period (2010-2015). Natixis
starting from 2006. The critical year is 2013, in which almost all the banks
reduced total assets (except for Alpha bank, BPER, Sabadell) by more than
7.5% on average with a peak of 20.32% of Deutsche Bank. Conversely for
Alpha Bank total assets rose by 26.51%.
The drop in total assets reflects the contraction in loans shown by 22
banks out of 30 in the sample (especially by Spanish banks - BBVA, Sabadell,
Santander, Bankinter, Caixabank - BNP, Crédit Agricole, Deutsche Bank) in
the period 2010-2015, after a rise for all of the banks during 2006-2010.
The two critical years are 2012 and 2013, in which all sample banks except
Alpha Bank and Sabadell decreased the amount of loans by an average of
4.95%. Nonetheless, starting from 2014 all of the banks in the sample increased
xloans to customers from the previous year.
Conversely, the majority of sample banks (18) increased total securities
(inclusive of derivatives) in the period 2010-2015.
Practically all the banks in the sample (except Intesa Sanpaolo and Ubi)
considerably expanded their common equity (with an average rise of 150% over
the entire period) with 2010 and 2015 being the years of the most relevant
increases
Sample banks’ profitability, measured by both Return on Assets (ROA)
and Return on Equity (ROE), halved during the period, with contractions
from 2006 to 2015 for almost all the banks in the sample that is the result of a
continued downward trend. For some banks profitability starts to marginally
recover in 2014 while for others in 2015.
The decrease of Market To Book ratio over 2006-2015 is the result of (i) a
negative variation during the period 2006-2010 for all the banks in the sample
(which in turn reflects the average 60% drop of the ratio in 2007); and (ii) a
positive variation in 2010-2015 (except for the Spanish banks BBCA, Sabadell
and Banco Popular Espanol) that was mostly achieved in 2012 with the ratio
starting to decrease again from 2014.
As expected, the most stable aggregates, measured in terms of percentage
standard deviation of observations, both across the sample and also over the
period are the various capital ratios that reflect regulatory requirements Total
capital ratio (30.31%), Tier 1 Ratio (33.33%), CET1 (37.93%) that for all
sample banks increased in the period as a result of higher capital ratios imposed
by authorities.
Conversely and somewhat surprisingly, other ratios, more directly connected
to business models were actually even more stable across banks and over the
entire period: Net Interest Income/Total Operating Income (22.14%) and the
cost/income ratio (26.39%) the Loans to deposits (30.35%) and Risk weighted
assets to total assets (44.31%).
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The most profitable banks (measured both in terms of ROA and ROE) in
the ten year period vary considerably over time so slicing the model based on
profitability would have led to quite different results based on the starting year
and the profitability measure used. Conversely, size and price/book ratios are
far more stable.
Comparing profitability with risk shows that larger banks in our sample tend
to have higher and less volatile profitability. Low volatility is also an ex post
measure of sustainability. Sustainable profitability is important for supervisors
since it means that the bank has sufficient income-generating capacity to enable
it to maintain an adequate capital base via retained earnings.
The division by business models is actually rather constant over time. In
our classification we divide sample banks by business models based - investment
banks if loans are less than 15% of total assets or securities are more than
60% of total assets, and as commercial banks if loans are more than 60%
of total assets or securities are less than 15% of total assets and then, after
these criteria are applied, all other banks are classified based on judgment,
taking into account the scope of derivatives activities, the relative shares of
securities and loans, and the share of trading income in total revenue – based
on the values of the two ratios at the start of the period (2006). Though
some differences in the three groups emerge (Figure 3.13, 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16)
and we find evidence that commercial banks are and are likely to remain less
profitable for as long as the ECB official interest rates will remain very low
or negative (Brogi et al., 2015), it is striking that the standard deviation for
each of the groups is actually higher than for the entire sample. Moreover,
practically same breakdown by business model emerges by applying the ratios
to all the years in the period. This provides evidence for the fact that business
models tend to be viscous over time. The division by geographical area leads
to similar, somewhat discouraging, results.
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Conclusion: in this paper we slice and dice the results achieved by the
Euro areas top 30 listed banks in the period from 2006-2015. The most striking
similarities in banks in the sample seem to be actually related to their business
model, they have similar cost income ratios and are still all considerably
dependent on interest income for their profitability. Comparing the 30 banks
which make up the Eurostoxx Index, business models have remained very stable
in the period (the major exception being Bankia, that changes the share of
loans on total assets from 68% in 2010 to 47% in 2013 – and 53% in 2015 – and
the share of total securities on total assets from 19% in 2010 to 39% in 2013 –
and 36% in 2015). All banks rely quite significantly on Net Interest Income
(almost 2/3 of Total Income) and Loans to Customers are quite viscous.
Despite the progressive decrease in interest rates, sample banks managed
to maintain their net interest income margin, while total operating income
(inclusive of a more fluctuating non-interest income) dropped. However, oper-
ating cost containment enabled to maintain stable cost/income ratios. Lower
profitability stemmed mainly from write-downs of loans. Size seems to be as
significant as business model in explaining performance (measured both in
terms of ROA and ROE). Moreover, based on this analysis larger banks seem
to be more profitable and at the same time present lower volatility in their
results.
The starting point of a business model analysis is the identification of the
more profitable players which are then investigated to assess the key drivers
for their profitability. However, our analysis does not lead to clearly identify
a consistent set of best performers over the period. In other words, a BMA
conducted starting on any one given year would have led to chose banks which
in subsequent years were no longer the better performers, thus casting a shadow
over the sustainability of their prior superior performance and ultimately on
their suitability as reference points for other players.
These findings need to be further investigated but would suggest that
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structural reforms such as ring-fencing commercial banking activities would
not necessarily lead to more stable banks but possibly to banks which could
be easier to resolve. Lastly, as concerns more specifically BMA, it could be
argued that in the period sample banks endeavoured to pursue more attractive
business models even without being nudged by regulators, however it may have
proved not to be so easy improve profitability with or without a change in
business models irrespective of their potential wish to do so.
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1Chapter 1
The big bank theory
Into the bank Corporate Governance literature
Abstract: "Alongside adequate capital and organization, the third factor of the
stability of the banking system is the quality of Corporate Governance" (Draghi,
2008). Corporate Governance of banks is not only important it also unique (Levine,
2004). Sound bank Corporate Governance is a crucial element for promoting a more
resilient financial system (Financial Stability Board (FSB), 2013) and sustaining
economic growth (Basel Committee of Banking Supervision (BCBS), 2015).
A systematic literature review is conducted on a sample of articles published on
peer-reviewed academic journals. Balancing theoretical and empirical contributions,
findings show that academic research on bank Corporate Governance is mainly
focused on risks potentially faced by banks and their performance capabilities. This
paper examines the developments of bank Corporate Governance literature and
tries to shed some light on the causality dilemma between theory and practice, by
investigating whether or not the progress of regulation and supervision in the area
of bank governance follows academic findings or vice versa.
Keywords: Banks, Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Risk management,
Compensation, Ownership
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1.1 Introduction
Soundness of the financial and banking system underpins economic growth
by ensuring an effective and efficient allocation of resources (Levine and Zervos,
1998; Beck et al., 2000; Levine et al., 2000; Claessens and Laeven, 2003) and
exerting an important influence on Corporate Governance of firms (Franks and
Mayer, 2001; Santos and Rumble, 2006; Dika et al., 2013).
Indeed, as further investigated in this paper, both academics and prac-
titioners, claim that failures and weaknesses of bank Corporate Governance
caused, to an important extent, the financial crisis that commenced in 2007
and plagued the economy until the recent years (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Al-Sa’eed,
2012).
As a matter of fact, several studies support the need for banks to be subject
to specific governance provisions due to the complex and opaqueness of their
business (Caprio and Levine, 2002; Levine, 2004; Macey and O’ Hara, 2003;
Brogi, 2008). Bank Corporate Governance indeed appears to be different
from that of other firms (Hopt, 2013, Becht et al., 2011; Mehran et al., 2011),
therefore financial intermediaries are unique also from a Corporate Governance
perspective (Llewellyn, 2002).
While there is a growing body of literature on governance of financial
institutions there is notably a lack of a comprehensive vision of the topic
(Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Adams and Mehran, 2005; Caprio et al., 2007).
Furthermore, there is a striking gap between the perspective of regulators and
supervisors and main academic researches and findings.
In order to assess to what extent academic knowledge supports decisions
taken by regulators and supervisors we first examine the academic debate
concerning bank Corporate Governance by conducting a systematic literature
review on 120 scholarly publications in the period 19801 -2015 selected among
peer-reviewed academic journals.
1First paper included in the sample.
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This paper speaks to the call by Macey and O’Hara (2003), Adams and
Mehran (2005), Caprio et al. (2007) for a better understanding of the specific
issues of bank Corporate Governance development and tries to shed some
light on the causality dilemma between theory and practice, by investigating
whether or not the progress of regulation and supervision in the area of bank
governance follows academic findings. Hence, this research balances theoretical
and empirical contributions in Corporate Governance literature, moreover
findings of this paper have relevant policy implications by making a clear and
concrete contribution on the on-going debate on bank Corporate Governance.
The main findings of this paper lead to assert that there is an increasing
understanding of the fundamentals of bank Corporate Governance such as
board structure, committees, risk management, and ownership structure. This
result stands out from both banking and institutional perspective. Indeed,
authorities have introduced several provisions with the aim of strengthening
risk management regulation, and assessing the accuracy and usefulness of
information provided to and from banks’ directors also by engaging more
frequently with board and management. Notwithstanding this, standard
setters and regulators tend to focus respectively on what the board should do
and must do and the necessary competences of board members as opposed
to structural characteristics (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010;
FSB, 2013; Directive 2013/36/EU or CRD IV; Bank of Italy, 2008) (Brogi,
2011).
Nonetheless, there is still a lot of work to do to implement sound Corpo-
rate Governance. This paper examines the developments of bank Corporate
Governance literature trying to shed some light on the causality dilemma
between theory and practice, by investigating whether or not the progress of
regulation and supervision in the area of bank governance follows academic
findings or viceversa. There is a long term supervisory perspective resulted by
the investigation of the literature the purpose of banks’ Corporate Governance
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is less to safeguard shareholders and investors, but to safeguard depositors and
other debt holders.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in paragraph 2, Corpo-
rate Governance is broadly defined to include the interface between economic
and financial environment; the method used to conduct the research and the
composition of the sample is described in paragraph 3; paragraph 4 presents
a review of the relevant literature on Corporate Governance in banking and
compares it with the regulatory and supervisory provisions to contribute to the
ongoing debate on the topic starting from the board structure; finally, policy
implications as well as provocative areas for future research are discussed.
1.2 Corporate Governance
Corporate Governance can be broadly defined as processes and relations by
which firms are managed. A first definition of Corporate Governance is given
by Prowse (1998): "Corporate Governance is rules, standards and organisations
in an economy that governs the behaviour of corporate owners, directors, and
managers and define their duties and accountability to outside investors, i.e.,
shareholders and lenders".
A more detailed definition of Corporate Governance is provided by the
OECD: "Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between a com-
pany’s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corpo-
rate Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the
company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring
performance are determined" (OECD, 2004; 2015). In short, Corporate Gover-
nance arrangements allocate rights and responsibilities among agents of every
firms and affected stakeholders (e. g. board of directors, executive managers,
shareholders, regulators). Indeed, much of the contemporary debate regarding
Corporate Governance has been focused on how to deal with conflicting stake-
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holder interests. The latter have given rise to different theories that are the
object of on-going debates for both academics and regulators (in particular:
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yermack, 1996;
Eisenberg et al., 1998); resource based view (Mahooney, 1992; Peteraf, 1993;
Wernerfelt, 1995, Coff, 1999); transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1979;
1981); stakeholders’ theory (Freeman, 1984); stewardship theory (Donaldson,
1990; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; 1994; Davis et al., 1997)).
As concerns the institutional debate on Corporate Governance, though
regulations vary worldwide, general, non-binding principles have been issued
by various international organisations (Brogi, 2008) (such as stock exchanges,
international organisations, associations, institutional investors mainly) in
the last two decades in co-operation with governments of different countries,
referred to both listed and unlisted companies. The most relevant Principles
have been issued by The Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (the Cadbury Report, 1992); The Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Principles of Corporate Governance
(originally developed in 1999, then updated in 2004 and finally revised in 2015
with the co-operation of G20 Organisation)); The Federal Government in the
United States (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002); the European Commission
(the Commission Recommendation on the role of non-executive or supervisory
directors of listed companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board
2005/162/EC) and the United Kingdom Government (UK Governance code,
2010).
In particular OECD Principles are aimed to preserve the basis for an
effective Corporate Governance framework; outline the rights and equitable
treatment of shareholders and key ownership functions; define the role of
stakeholders in Corporate Governance, the role of disclosure and transparency
in perceiving the companies’ objectives and the responsibilities of the board
(OECD, 2004; 2015).
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Financial institutions require a distinct analysis of Corporate Governance
issues (Adams and Mehran, 2003; Macey and O’Hara, 2003) as well as specific
regulatory measures due to the complexity and opaqueness of their business
(Levine, 2004; Mehran et al., 2011). A broad description of banking activities
concerns in credit allocation and financial services provision in order to reduce
transaction costs and asymmetric information (Batthacharya and Thakor, 1993;
Allen and Santomero, 1998). They also play a decisive role in the Corporate
Governance of other firms (Franks and Mayer, 2001; Santos and Rumble, 2006;
Dika et al., 2013) by overseeing investment decisions. To sum up, Caselli (2010)
argues that "governance and strategy takes place in a broad perspective in which
banks and the financial system have to deal with five significant factors today:
regulations, customers, knowledge, capital and synergies". As a matter of fact,
when banks are efficient, they facilitate growth and stability for the economy
as a whole by ensuring an effective and efficient resource allocation (Levine
and Zervos, 1998; Beck et al., 2000; Levine et al., 2000; Claessens and Laeven,
2003; Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2006).
The unique characteristics of financial intermediaries also encompass their
Corporate Governance (Llewellyn, 2002). Indeed, OECD Principles have also
been adopted as one of the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Standards
for Sound Financial Systems serving FSB, G20 and OECD members; have been
used by the World Bank Group and are an effective tool for implementation of
the Guidelines on Corporate Governance of banks issued by the BCBS (OECD,
2004; 2015; BCBS, 2015).
In particular, the BCBS (2015) has recently provided a definition of bank
Corporate Governance that broadly describes the role of Corporate Governance
from bankers’ perspective: "Corporate Governance determines the allocation
of authority and responsibilities by which the business and affairs of a bank are
carried out by its board and senior management"2.
2"Corporate Governance determines the allocation of authority and responsibilities by
which the business and affairs of a bank are carried out by its board and senior management
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Moreover, the European Commission (EC) and the European Banking Au-
thority (EBA) have developed a new regulatory framework to implement these
new standards in the European Union (EU) (Regulation (EU) No 575/2013
also known as CRR and Directive 2013/36/EU or CRD IV).
The following section shows the procedure run to assess the review and
describes the main characteristics of the sample.
1.3 Methodology and population of the sam-
ple
1.3.1 Methodology
Consistent with prior systematic assessments of governance literature (e. g.
Pugliese et al., 2009; Abatecola et al., 2013) the selection process is performed
as follows:
1. Choose Scopus and ScienceDirect as research databases;
2. Select all articles published in journals with a peer reviewed evaluation
process, written in English language thereby excluding books, chapters
in books, conference proceedings, working papers and other unpublished
works so as to ensure the comparability of the contents;
3. Ensure substantive relevance of the potential articles by looking for
the combination of "Corporate Governance" and ("banks" or "financial
institutions") in the keywords of the articles;
[...]", including how they: set the bank’s strategy and objectives; select and oversee personnel;
operate the bank’s business on a day-to-day basis; protect the interests of depositors, meet
shareholder obligations, and take into account the interests of other recognised stakeholders;
align corporate culture, corporate activities and behaviour with the expectation that the bank
will operate in a safe and sound manner, with integrity and in compliance with applicable laws
and regulations; and establish control functions. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS), Corporate Governance principles for banks, July 2015.
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4. Ensure relevance of the articles by reading all abstracts checking for
a discussion related to bank Corporate Governance following the “fit
for purpose” approach by Boaz and Ashby (2003) and Denyer et al.
(2008); e. Survey remaining articles by a complete reading in order to
check substantive relevance for a discussion related to bank Corporate
Governance;
5. Consolidate results.
This leads to identify a sample of articles published in top finance and
management journals3 from 1980 to 2015. Furthermore a content analysis is
then run following Insch et al. (1997), Bos and Tarnai (1999) and Guthrie et
al. (2004) so as to analyse the development of research on bank Corporate
Governance, by classifying all basic elements of each paper: (1) type of article;
(2) impact factor of the journal and cites of the article; (3) main research topic
and research question(s); (4) dataset, period of observation and geographical
setting; (5) methodology, including variables and robustness checks; (6) result(s)
3American Economic Review (AER); Applied Economics Letters (AEL); Applied Financial
Economics (AFE); Banca Impresa Societá (BIS); Business Strategy & the Environment
(BSE); Contemporary Economics (CE); Corporate Governance: An International Review
(CGIR); Corporate Ownership & Control (COC); Economic Modeling (EM); Economic
Policy Review (EPR); Emerging Markets Review (EMR); European Economic Review
(EER); European Journal Economics (EJE); European Journal of Law & Economics (EJLE);
Financial Management (FM); International Journal of Business & Management (IJBM);
International Journal of Economics & Finance (IJEF); International Journal of Managerial
Finance (IJMF); International Review of Economics & Finance (IREF); International Review
of Financial Analysis (IRFA); Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE); Journal of Banking
and Finance (JBF); Journal of Business & Social Sciences (JBSS); Journal of Business
Ethics (JBE); Journal of Business Finance & Accounting (JBFA); Journal of Corporate
Finance (JCF); Journal of Corporate Law Studies (JCLS); Journal of Economics & Business
(JEB); Journal of Economics & Finance (JEF); Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis
(JFQA); Journal of Financial Economics (JFE); Journal of Financial Intermediation (JFI);
Journal of Financial Research (JFR); Journal of Financial Services Research (JFSR); Journal
of Financial Stability (JFS); Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS); Journal of
International Money & Finance (JIMF); Journal of Law & Economics (JLE); Journal of
Management & Governance (JMG); Journal of Monetary Economics (JME); Journal of
Money, Credit & Banking (JMCB); Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions
(JRMFI); Pacific Basin Finance Journal (PBFJ); Quarterly Review of Economics & Finance
(QREF); Review of Economic Perspectives (REP); Review of Economics & Statistics (RES);
Review of Finance (RF); Review of Financial Economics (RFE); Review of Financial Studies
(RFS); The Accounting Review (AR); The Journal of Finance (JF).
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and conclusion(s).
1.3.2 Population of the sample
The research conducted on the whole set of articles, outlined that the
attention regarding banking Corporate Governance is mainly focused on risks
potentially faced by banks and their performance capability.
The most frequent topics in the bank Corporate Governance literature
are board structure, risk management, executive compensation, ownership
structure that are normally investigated considering their impact on risks and
performance drivers. In particular, as revealed by Financial Stability Board
(FSB, 2013) board structure covers the functions and responsibilities of the
board in ensuring that the "firm has an appropriate risk governance framework
given the firm’s business model, complexity and size which is embedded into the
firm’s risk culture". Risk management function is responsible for identifying,
measuring, monitoring, and recommending strategies to control and mitigate
risks. It also reports on risk exposures of firms, so as to ensure a risk profile
in line with the Risk Appetite Framework (RAF) approved by the Board of
Directors. As concerns executive compensation, it is related with risk since an
inadequate compensation structure may lead to excessive risk-taking. Finally,
there is a wide strand of literature that relates risk and performance to the
ownership structure and its concentration. Thus, breakdown based on the
main research direction presented in each paper, leads to identify four main
areas of interest Table 1.1: Board structure (46 papers, corresponding to 32%
of the sample); Risk management (39, 27%); Ownership structure (32, 22%);
Compensation (26, 18%).
Moreover, the most cited articles for each of the topics, are respectively
Macey and O’Hara (2003) published in Economic Policy Review with 618 cites
on Google Scholar; Barth et al. (2004) in Journal of Financial Intermediation
with 1785 cites (which is also the most cited article in the full sample), Altunbas
10
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Table 1.1. Composition of the sample
Topic N. of articles N. of articles (%)
Board Structure 46 32%
Risk Management 39 27%
Ownership 32 22%
Compensation 26 18%
Total 143
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 1.1. Research setting
Authors’ own elaboration
(2001) and Berger (1995b) in Journal of Money, Credit & Banking with 556 and
756 cites, respectively. Table 1.2 shows the 30 Journals which have been most
cited in bank Corporate Governance articles, considering average citations per
article. The Journal that received the highest average citations is Journal of
Financial Economics, that published 4 articles on bank Corporate Governance.
Conversely, Journal of Banking & Finance published the largest number of
articles on bank Corporate Governance, 32, with 150 average citations per
article considering year of publication. Geographical setting reveals that the
majority of articles (45%) covers a sample of International banks, 26% is based
on American banks, 13% on European banks, 11% on Asian banks and 5% of
the articles in the sample are conducted on African banks (Figure 1.1).
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Figure 1.2 shows the breakdown of different topics by geographical setting.
In particular, it is notable a larger focus on compensation in American and
International samples of banks (respectively of 7% and 6% of the full sample
of articles). This could be a result deriving from the largest distribution of
data regarding American banks compared with other Continents. Figure 1.3
shows the historical development in bank Corporate Governance literature,
broken down by topic. As above mentioned the first article included in the
sample has been published in 1980, hence the period of this analysis covers
the period 1980-2015. As illustrated in the figure, bank Corporate Governance
has become an increasingly important area for research in the last decade,
especially as a reaction to the last financial crisis. Starting from 2008 the
number of articles increased over time with two major peaks in 2011 and 2013.
In particular, noteworthy is the increasing interest on Board Structure since
the financial crisis, in line with the general historical development on bank
Corporate Governance. contrariwise, compensation appears to be a hot topic
for researchers in two waves, in the period 1993-1997, and in 2011-2015, when
the literature starts to depict executive compensation as one of the causes of the
financial crisis of 2007, due to its link with excessive risk-taking (Fahlenbrach
and Stulz, 2009; Beltratti and Stulz, 2009; DeYoung et al., 2009; Erkens et
al., 2009). A more detailed discussion of the findings is given by the following
section, divided into the four different groups.
1.4 Board structure
The Board of Directors (BoD) plays an important role in the governance
arrangements of any firm (Fama and Jensen, 1983a; 1983b; Williamson, 1983).
The main functions of the BoD are controlling and advising (Zahra and Pearce,
1989; Gabrielsson and Huse, 2004). The control function consists in the
supervision of managers’ activities so as to preserve shareholders’ interests.
12
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Figure 1.2. Topics by geographical setting
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 1.3. Topics by year of publication
Authors’ own elaboration
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Table 1.2. Top 30 cited Journal in bank Corporate Governance
Journal N. of articles Total cites(Google Scholar)
Average of cites
(Google Scholar)
Std. Dev. of cites
(Google Scholar)
JFE 4 3129 782 316
JMCB 2 1322 661 95
EPR 4 1482 371 215
JFE 4 1359 340 377
JFI 8 2555 319 574
JME 3 793 264 71
IREF 1 162 162 -
JBF 32 4801 150 152
JFQA 2 250 125 -
FM 1 120 120 -
JCF 7 680 97 114
IJMF 2 186 93 55
JEF 1 85 85 -
JFS 2 164 82 73
RES 1 82 82 -
JFR 2 161 81 48
AFE 1 79 79 -
JIMF 1 75 75 -
RFE 1 70 70 -
AR 1 69 69 -
JLE 1 68 68 -
JEB 4 259 65 56
PBFJ 2 109 55 7
JAE 2 105 53 42
RFS 1 49 49 -
BSE 1 42 42 -
RF 5 177 35 15
JFSR 3 97 32 16
JBFA 1 30 30 -
CGIR 8 239 30 25
Others 44 286 13 12
Total 143 19085 133 244
Authors’ own elaboration
As an advisor, the board supports strategic business decisions by providing
opinions and directions to managers. As concerns financial institutions and
in particular banks, the monitoring function is a crucial task for the board,
due to the complexity and opaqueness of their business model (Levine, 2004;
Mehran et al., 2011).
From an institutional perspective, improving board structure is considered
vital by international standard setters in order to enhance Corporate Gover-
nance functioning (OECD, 2004; 2015; BCBS, 2006; 2010; 2015). Both the
14
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EBA and the BCBS consider BoD as one of the main internal governance
features of banks. Directors are responsible for delegating power within the
institution and setting objectives for the bank and the levels of risk-appetite.
The BoD is also responsible for the organization of the internal control system
(EBA, 2011). Board of directors has "overall responsibility for the bank, in-
cluding approving and overseeing management’s implementation of the bank’s
strategic objectives, governance framework and corporate culture" (BCBS, 2015).
Moreover, "The board should structure itself in terms of leadership, size and
the use of committees so as to effectively carry out its oversight role and other
responsibilities. This includes ensuring that the board has the time and means
to cover all necessary subjects in sufficient depth and have a robust discussion
of issues" (BCBS, 2015).
As mentioned in the introduction, contributions try to identify how board
characteristics influence effectiveness and this mainly relate them to perfor-
mance drivers and risk measures. Articles on board structure may be further
subdivided in four different research sub-topics: board size, independence,
diversity and CEO duality.
1.4.1 Size
Size is one of the characteristics that could be crucial in the effectiveness
of BoD functioning (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Pathan, 2009; Grove et
al., 2011; Adams and Mehran, 2011).
As above mentioned, boards’ key roles are controlling and supporting firm’s
strategy. Indeed, Corporate Governance literature that examines the effect
of board size (reviewed by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Denis and McConnell,
2003; Bebchuk and Weisbach, 2009) mainly outlined two alternative theories:
the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a;
1983b; Jensen, 1993; Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg et al., 1998) which focuses on
the relevance of board monitoring and argues that larger boards may reduce
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effectiveness and the resource based view (Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik,
1978; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) that posits that larger boards may provide
expertise and resources that are required to deal with complex activities and
thus lead the board to be more effective in its advisory role.
Even though a great number of articles have investigated the impact of
board size, evidence is inconclusive and confirms that in Corporate Governance
of banks (as well as companies) one size does not fit all (Coles et al., 2008).
Adams and Mehran (2003; 2012) find support for the resource based view
and specifically that BHC boards are larger than those of manufacturing
firms, although they have been declining in size over time (Adams, 2003).
Furthermore, the authors use a sample of 32 Bank Holding Companies from 1986
to 1999 to investigate the relationship between the natural logarithm of board
size and Tobin’s Q. Their results suggest that larger boards enhance banks’
performance and this result could be driven by a larger number of directors
with subsidiary directorships within larger boards, that could contribute in
dealing with organizational complexity (Adams, 2003; 2012). Though it is not
the main focus of their article, with Aebi et al. (2012) using data on 573 US
banks over the crises period (1st July 2007 to 31st December 2008) find that
a larger board increases bank performance, measured by Return On Equity
(ROE) and buy and hold returns, although board size is not the main focus of
the article.
Consistent with this result, Belkhir (2009), using panel data techniques
with an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method, shows a positive
relation between the logarithm of board size and two different measures of
performance (Tobin’s Q and Return On Assets (ROA)) on an International
sample composed by 174 banks and savings and loan holding companies, over
the 1995-2002 period. Chahine and Safieddine (2011) run a fixed-effect model
to examine the effect of board size and composition on performance using
749 Lebanese bank years’ data during 1992-2006. The authors find that bank
16
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performance (measured by ROA and ROE) is positively related to board size.
Conversely and consistent with the agency theory, other studies support a
negative association between board size and bank functioning, measured by
both risk and performance.
Staikouras et al. (2007) find that large boards negatively influence bank
profitability (measured by ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q) of a sample of 58 large
European banks. Uwuigbe and Fakile (2011) use Nigerian Stock Exchange
factbook data published in 2008, containing information on board size and
performance proxies. The authors find that a smaller board size enhances
financial performance and reduces free-riding problems in Nigerian banks.
Pathan and Faff (2013) conduct a two-step system Generalised Moments
Method (GMM) estimation method and an OLS regression of different perfor-
mance measures (Pre-Tax Operating Income, Average ROE, Average ROA, Net
Interest Margin, Tobin’s Q and Average Stock Return) and find a significant
and negative relationship with board size for a sample of 300 Bank Holding
Companies (BHCs) over the period 1997-2000. Wang et al. (2012) study
the relationship between Corporate Governance and performance by using
an innovative two-stage approach based on Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality,
Management Earnings and Liquidity (CAMEL) rating. The authors find that
there are negative impacts of board size on US BHCs’ performance in 2007.
Liang et al. (2013) analysing a sample of 50 largest Chinese banks during
2003–2010 find that board size has a significantly negative impact on bank
performance and bank loans quality.
Lastly, there are numerous articles that do not find any statistically robust
relationship between board size and bank functioning that led researchers to
question to what extent board size matters for firm performance.
Simpson and Gleason (1999) find no effect of the number of directors on
the probability of financial distress as well as Belkhir (2009), analysing 174
US financial companies. This is also consistent with results outlined by Brogi
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(2011) in comparing the influence that board size exerts respectively on 67
firms and 33 banks performance.
Finally, Erkens et al. (2012) do not find that board size is related to
bank performance during the crisis. Conversely, de Andres and Vallelado
(2008) analyse data of 69 banks from six OECD countries over the period
1995-2005. The authors obtain a hump-shaped relationship between board size
and performance that suggests that the ideal number of bank directors to be
around 19.
Results extend Larcker et al. (2007) and Grove et al. (2011) that find some
evidence for an inverted U-shaped relationship between ROA and board size.
Figure 1.6 and Figure 1.7 summarise results from a sub-sample of articles that
apply comparable methodologies.
Literature regarding the relationship between board size and risk is relatively
more recent possibly fuelled by the financial crisis that evidenced the short-
comings of Return on Equity as a measure of performance in banking. Again,
mixed results emerge.
Pathan (2009) and Minton et al. (2010) find that bank board size of US
banks is negatively related to risk-taking (measured as total risk, idiosyncratic
risk and systematic risk) during the pre-crisis period. This is also consistent
with the study of Faleye and Krishnan (2010) that find that smaller boards
ensure fewer junk loans provisioning of banks and are also reduce speculative
actions on a sample of 51 banks over 1994–2006. Rachdi and Ameur (2011)
explore data of 11 large Tunisian commercial banks over the period 1997-2006
in order to investigate whether board characteristics affect performance and
incentives to take risk in banking industry. Using both Generalized Least
Square (GLS) Random Effect (RE) and GMM system approaches, their results
support the idea that bank board structure is a determinant factor for bank
performance and bank risk-taking. In particular, the authors find a small
bank board is associated with more performance (measured by ROA and
18
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ROE) and with more bank risk-taking (Z-score). Berger et al. (2012) argue
that during the recent financial crisis board size, as well as other Corporate
Governance characteristics of US commercial banks are not related to bank
stability (measured in terms of probability of default). Garcia-Marco and
Roblez-Fernandez (2008) exploring a sample of Spanish banks, show that
board size matters for risk-taking, and in particular they find smaller size
institutions assuming lower risks, due to a moral hazard behaviour. More
recently, Elyasiani and Ling (2015) investigate the association between busy
directors and both bank performance and risk by employing the 3 Stages
Least Squares (3SLS) technique. Though their main focus is the impact of
risk management characteristics on banks performance, the authors find that
performance and board size do not have a significant relationship, whereas the
number of directors is strongly and positively associated with higher risk-taking
(total, market, idiosyncratic, credit and default risks).
The analysis result in a there is a noteworthy lack of univocal consensus
about an adequate board size in order to enhance performance and risk-
avoiding. This is also notably from an institutional perspective. The BoD
should "periodically, and at least annually, assess the structure, size, compo-
sition and performance of the management body and make recommendations
to the management body with regard to any changes" (CRD IV). This is in
line with the BCBS Principles (2015) that suggest to BoD to "periodically
review its structure, size and composition as well as committees’ structures and
coordination".
Standard setters and regulators tend to focus respectively on what the
board should and must do and therefore underline the importance of the
competences of board members as opposed to the structural characteristics of
the board (Bank of Italy, 2008; BCBS, 2010; 2015; Brogi, 2011). Indeed, since
2012, EBA has provided "Guidelines on on the assessment of the suitability
of members of the management body and key function holders" with the aim
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of defining the assessment process regarding the suitability of a member and
other criteria relevant "for the functioning of the management body, including
potential conflicts of interest, the ability to commit sufficient time, the overall
composition of the management body, the collective knowledge and expertise
required and members ability to perform their duties independently without
undue influence from other persons." Furthermore, the implementation of these
Guidelines has been surveyed in June 2015 by EBA, resulting in divergent
supervisory practices. Hence, EBA concluded that "the existing EBA guidelines
have not led to sufficient convergence in supervisory practices, and proposed the
incorporation in its forthcoming review of the guidelines of a number of specific
best practices observed." Also, the BCBS (2010; 2015) focuses on what the board
should do4 without providing specific rules regarding banks’ board structure.
Nonetheless, the majority of the 40 jurisdictions surveyed by the OECD in the
2015 and 2017 Corporate Governance factbook set the minimum board size as
low as three or five members, while a maximum board size requirement is less
common, with only eight jurisdictions setting a limit ranging from 11 to 21
(OECD, 2017)5 (Tables 1.4 and 1.5).
4"Board members should be and remain qualified, individually and collectively, for their
positions. They should understand their oversight and Corporate Governance role and be
able to exercise sound, objective judgment about the affairs of the bank." (BCBS, 2010; 2015).
5Eight jurisdictions set forth a maximum board size ranging from 11 to 21, while the
others leave it to the company’s discretion. Twenty-five jurisdictions set forth a minimum
board size of three or five (seven for large companies in Chile and 12 for the companies with
two-tier boards in Norway). In the two-tier board system, no jurisdiction sets a maximum
size requirement for the management board, while some jurisdictions set a minimum size
requirement (five in Norway, two in Italy and one in Estonia, Germany, Poland and Slovenia)
(OECD, 2017).
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Figure 1.4. Board size and directors tenure for listed companies
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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Figure 1.5. Board size and directors tenure for listed companies (cont.d)
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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1.4.2 Independence
The BoD is the bridge between management and shareholders (OECD,
2004; 2015). Studies concerning board structure point out that the presence of
independent directors (i.e. directors without direct ties with management) on
the board contribute to a better monitoring of managers (Fama and Jensen,
1983a; 1983b; Boyd, 1994; Rechner and Dalton, 1991). This strand of literature
also belongs to the agency theory and in particular it is related to the study
of Jensen and Meckling (1976), Fama and Jensen (1983a; 1983b) and Beasley
(1996). The latter argue that the agency problem deriving from the separation
between ownership and control needs to be mitigated with a sound and efficient
Corporate Governance. The agency relationship is the engagement of an agent
(manager) to preserve and safeguard principal (shareholder)’s interests on its
behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Conventional wisdom recognises that
independence, diversity and expertise enhance Corporate Governance quality
and safeguard shareholders’ interests. Alternative views also exist on the role
of independent directors.
Fama and Jensen (1983a; 1983b) and Beasley (1996) identify independence
as a vital characteristic of directors to mitigate agency conflicts between
management and shareholders because their role in the board permit them to
perform a better critical monitoring function. A different perspective is provided
by the stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Kent et al., 2010).
Following this view, inside and executive directors have greater knowledge
than independent directors with respect to their company’s characteristics and
provide better decision-making.
Bank Corporate Governance literature also recognizes the level of indepen-
dence of the board of directors as a critical issue for internal governance of
banks. As well as corporates, banks board of directors should act in order
to preserve shareholders’ interest. Nonetheless, banks differ from other types
of firms since they have a far wider number of stakeholders, that include
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depositors and other debt holders. Thus, the monitoring function of the board
of director of banks is very important. Univocal consensus on the ideal level of
independent members of the board is still missing, but most of the literature
shows that a higher level of outsider representation increases the likelihood of
the efficient outcome for the bank, measured by performance and risk-avoiding
capabilities.
Figure 1.10 and 1.11 show the findings of a sub-sample of comparable (as
concern the methodology) articles.
In line with agency theory, independent directors have incentives to properly
exert the control function, because they seek to protect their reputation (Pathan,
2009). Li and Song (2013) find that board independence positively affects
bank value of an international sample of banks. Consistent with this view,
Pathan and Skuly (2010) also find an endogenous relationship between different
bank Corporate Governance characteristics. Using a sample of 212 US BHCs
during the period 1997-2004, authors show that larger (in terms of assets) and
more diversified banks have larger and more independent boards. In the same
geographical setting, Cornett et al. (2010) extend the sample of observation to
300 publicly traded US banks during the financial crisis.
The authors find that bank performance is positively affected by a more
independent board. Furthermore, de Andres and Vallelado (2008) show a
non-linear (hump shaped) relationship between board independence and per-
formance, similar to the above-mentioned result regarding the relationship
between board size and performance. Liang et al. (2013) investigate the
relationship between the performance of 50 Chinese banks (measured by ROE,
pre-provision profit and stock of Non Performing Loans (NPLs)) during 2003-
2010 using an OLS methodology. The authors find that independence of board
of directors positively affects bank performance. More recently, Garcia-Meca
et. al (2015), show that Tobin’s Q and ROA are positively affected by the
presence of a higher number of independent directors, although it is not the
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main aspect studied in the article. They examine the board structure of 159
banks in nine countries during 2004-2010 using a GMM methodology, focusing
especially in the impact of gender diversity on bank performance, as further
investigated in this paper.
Also in line with the agency theory and consistent with the positive results in
terms of performance, there is some evidence of a negative relationship between
board independence and bank risk-taking. Indeed, Pathan (2009) investigating
a sample composed by 212 US BHCs over 1997–2004 as in Pathan and Skully
(2010), with a GLS and a RE technique, find that board independence is strongly
and negatively related to bank risk (measured by total risk, idiosyncratic risk,
and systematic risk). Similar results are reported in Minton et al. (2010) and
Faleye and Krishnan (2010). The latter find that board independence reduces
riskiness measured by the long-term S&P credit rating and inclusion of financial
covenants in loan contracts, although it is not related to the lending risk
diversification. Yeh et al. (2011) examine whether the performance during the
recent financial crisis is better for financial institutions with more independent
directors on different committees. Using the data of the 20 largest financial
institutions from G8 countries during the 2007–08 financial crisis the authors
show that performance during the crisis is higher for financial institutions
with more independent directors on auditing and risk committees. Moreover,
the influence of committee independence on bank performance is particularly
relevant for civil law countries (measured by a dummy variable). Yeh et
al. (2011) also suggest that regulation authorities should enforce regulation
compliance to improve director independence, particularly for auditing and
risk committees in banking industry, since independent directors in banking
are supposed to reduce excessive risk-taking behaviours.
Even if independent directors may enhance the effectiveness of monitoring
bank management, they may lack in practical bank business expertise (Adams,
2012). Thus, supporting the Stewardship Theory also in bank Corporate
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Governance, Adams and Ferreira (2007) comment the negative result obtained
between performance and independence with the reduction of the information
among boards, due to the outside position of independents. This condition
negatively affects the advisory role of the board and may also reduce its
monitoring function.
Belkhir (2009) relates different characteristics of bank Corporate Gover-
nance with Tobin’s Q, and find that a higher number of independent directors
negatively affects the performance of an international sample of 260 banks,
using an OLS methodology. Aebi et al. (2012) also find a negative relationship
between the percentage of independent directors and performance but their
findings are not totally supported by the significance of their results. Consistent
with this view is the above-mentioned study of Pathan and Faff (2013). The
authors find a negative relationship between different performance measures
and independence of the board.
As in the case of board size, some authors do not find robust correlations
between director independence and bank results, both in terms of performance
and risk-taking. As concerns performance, Adams and Mehran (2005) and
Staikouras et al. (2007) find no significant relation between the degree of
board independence (measured by the percentage of independent directors)
and performance. The latter looking for the effect of board composition on
the performance of 58 European banks, does not find a significant relation
between independence and ROA.
Adams and Mehran (2012), using a sample of 32 International BHCs
receiving bailout money during 1986-1999 does not find a negative relationship
between Tobin’s Q and independence analysed with an OLS estimation method.
Moreover, the author suggests that independence may not always have the
sufficient expertise to oversee complex banking firms.
Pi and Timme (1993), Griffith et al. (2002) and Simpson and Gleason
(1999), study the effect of a higher number of independent directors on bank
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boards on the probability of financial distress. Nonetheless as mentioned above,
there is a wider strand of literature supporting the relevance of board inde-
pendence in the development of good Corporate Governance and a consequent
enhancement of bank functioning (Peni and Vähämaa, 2012). Indeed, standard
setters and regulators focus on board composition and favour independence.
Hence, regulation and legal systems have a significant impact on internal
governance arrangements of banks (Ferreira et al., 2012; Li and Song, 2013).
In particular, Li and Song (2013) reach two main conclusions in their study:
empowering official supervision reduces board independence and encouraging
private monitoring increases board independence. These findings are consistent
with Barth et al. (2004) and Beck et al. (2006).
Actually, since 2002 the Sarbanes–Oxley Act requires that boards have
audit committees consisting only of independent outside directors. The Codes
of Best Practice for Corporate Governance issued in many countries have called
for greater outside representation (Denis and McConnell, 2003). Despite the
fact that national approaches on the definition of independence6 for directors
vary considerably, and notwithstanding differences in board structure, almost
all jurisdictions have introduced a requirement or recommendation with regard
to a minimum number or ratio of independent directors7. In particular,
6Regarding the definition of independence, the typical criterion is a combination of: 1)
not to be a member, or an immediate family member of a member, of the management of
the company; 2) not to be an employee of the company or a company in the group; 3) not
to receive compensation from the company or its group other than directorship fees; 4) not
to have material business relations with the company or its group; 5) not to have been an
employee of the external auditor of the company or of a company in the group; 6) not to
exceed the maximum tenure as a board member; and 7) not to be or represent a significant
shareholder (IOSCO, 2007). The legal or regulatory approaches vary among jurisdictions,
particularly with regard to maximum tenure and independence from a significant shareholder.
19 jurisdictions set a maximum tenure as an independent director, varying from 5 to 15
years (with the mode at 12 years). At the expiration of the tenure, these directors are no
longer regarded as independent (in 14 jurisdictions), or need an explanation regarding their
independence (in five jurisdictions) (OECD, 2017).
7Only three jurisdictions (India, Hungary and the United States) have introduced a
binding requirement for a majority independent board, while the others take a "comply
or explain" approach. Japan amended the Company Act in 2014 and introduced a more
stringent disclosure requirement than the normal "comply or explain" approach, requiring
companies with no outside director to disclose in their annual reports the reason why
1.4 Board structure 29
the recommendation for majority independence is mostly the standard in
jurisdictions with a one-tier board system. (OECD, 2017). Also, the BCBS has
advocated a BoD with an adequate number of independent directors (BCBS,
2006; 2015).
appointing one is "inappropriate", as well as to explain that reason in the proxy materials of
the annual shareholder meetings. Four jurisdictions (Chile, France, Israel and the United
States) link the board independence requirement with the ownership structure of a company,
where companies with controlling shareholders are subject to less stringent requirements.
The role of independent directors in controlled companies is considered as different from that
played by the same in dispersed companies, since the characteristic of the agency problem
is different (e.g., the vertical agency problem is less common and the horizontal agency
problem is prevalent in controlled companies) (OECD, 2017).
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Figure 1.8. Board independence requirements for listed companies
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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Figure 1.9. Board independence requirements for listed companies (cont.d)
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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1.4.3 CEO Duality
Another important issue in researches conducted on board structure of
banks is the so-called CEO duality. It represents a situation in which the CEO
of a bank is also Chair of the board of directors.
Consistent with agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) CEO duality
may reduce the ability of the board in preserving shareholders’ interests. Indeed,
CEO may not separate personal interest from shareholders’ interests and the
control function of the board may be less effective (Jensen, 1993; Lasfer, 2006).
Moreover, the presence of a CEO who is also the Cahir of the board can
mitigate the agency problem by moderating the effect of board involvement in
executive management. From this perspective in the absence of CEO duality,
the requirement of a minimum level of independent directors in order to
enhance the advisory function of the board may be reduced without affecting
the monitoring function. The stewardship theory states that CEO duality
results in a more efficient and rapid decision-making process. Nonetheless it
enhances the strategic vision of the board, by providing long-term objectives
in line with shareholders’ interests.
Focusing on financial institutions, CEOs are key decision makers. In
particular, their risk propensity has a decisive role in the definition of the
strategy of the bank (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). As a consequence, their
position has a strong effect on both risk and performance of a bank. Indeed,
empirical research on the impact of CEO duality on banks’ performance (Pi
and Timme, 1993; Johnson et al., 1996; Griffith et al., 2002; Cooper, 2009;
Adnan et al., 2011) and banks’ risks (Simpson and Gleason, 1999; Pathan,
2009, Boujelbene and Nabila, 2011, De Jonghe et al., 2012, Rachdi et al.,
2013) provide different conclusion on the impact of CEO duality, nonetheless
most of the findings are not supported by sufficient significance. As concerns
performance, Pi and Timme (1993) find that banks with CEOs who are also
chairs of the board, over performed in respect of a situation without CEO
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duality. In particular, the authors study 112 US banks during 1987–1990 and
show a positive relation between CEO duality and ROA and an inverse relation
with costs.
Regarding the empirical evidences of CEO duality affecting risk-taking
of banks, several authors find some evidence that CEO power is negative
related with bank risk-taking. In particular, Simpson and Gleason (1999) find
a lower probability of financial distress when there is CEO duality using a
sample of 287 banks over the period 1989–1993. They also suggest that the
risk-avoiding function of a CEO who is also the Chair of the board is given
by the bias of protecting his role in the board. Consistently, Pathan (2009)
and Boujelbene and Nabila (2011) investigate the relationship of different
Corporate Governance variables of two different samples of banks and find that
the presence of a CEO who is also the Chair of the board is inversely related
with bank risks. The first author uses a sample composed by 212 US BHCs
during 1997-2004 and regresses CEO duality on different risk measures as total
risk, idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, assets return risk and insolvency risk).
Boujelbene and Nabila (2011) use a static panel and GLS methodology on a
sample of 10 commercial banks listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange during
1995-2007 measuring risk with three different drivers: total risk, insolvency risk,
and beta. The authors find that the coefficient of CEO duality is positive and
statistically significant and positively associated with total risk and insolvency
risk probably. This result is driven by a reduction of the control effectiveness of
the governance structure, resulting in an increase in bank risk-taking. Rachdi
et al. (2013) try to assess whether bank board structure is associated with
risk. The authors use a sample of 11 Tunisian conventional banks over the
period 2001-2011 and find that duality on boards is associated with more
insolvency risk, but has no significant effect on insolvency and credit risk.
De Jonghe et al. (2012) use a stochastic frontier approach on 65 commercial
banks operating in Turkey between 1988 and 2009. The authors, looking for
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a relationship between both internal and external governance mechanisms
(respectively CEO duality, board experience, political connections, education
profile and discipline exerted by shareholders, depositors, or skilled employees)
and bank performance, find that the presence of a more experienced CEO
(controlled by the cumulative number of years a particular manager has been at
the top of his or her organization) generally increases risk/return efficiency, as
suggested by human-capital theory Becker (1962). Kaymak and Bektas (2008)
also observe Turkish commercial banks (27) operating in the market between
2001-2004, but their findings support the stewardship view, by showing how
the presence of duality increases the risk of principal-principal conflict. The
authors run a cross-sectional data analysis investigating the association of
different governance drivers (board independence, CEO duality, board size,
and board tenure) with bank performance measured by ROA.
Another evidence of the consistency of the stewardship view is given by
Larcker et al. (2007). The latter is one of the first papers that finds CEO
duality negatively impacting on performance. The authors investigate different
Corporate Governance variables of a sample of 2106 financial and non-financial
firms between 2002 and 2003 by using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
This method is used to develop 14 multi-indicator indices from 39 individual
governance indicators, including CEO duality. Wang et al. (2012) also report
a negative impact of CEO duality on efficiency by exploring the relationship
between the operating performance and Corporate Governance of 68 BHCs in
the US with a modified Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) method.
Researchers also investigate whether CEO duality is not only associated
with bank risk/performance measures but also with bank functioning. Indeed,
Faleye and Krishnan (2010) and Grove et al. (2011) study the relationship
between CEO duality and lending activity. In particular, Faleye and Krishnan
(2010) find that the probability of lending to high-risk borrowers increases
with CEO duality. Grove et al. (2011) find a negative relationship with
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bank performance but don’t find a significant association with loan quality,
by adopting the factor structure to measure multiple dimensions of Corporate
Governance for 236 US public commercial banks. Savchenko and Semenova
(2015), exploring the effect of combining positions between the board of directors
and top management, demonstrate that there is a need for a broader approach
to regulating the spheres of director responsibility, and avoid CEO duality
for developed countries. They obtain this result from a sample of banks in
112 countries and measure bank profitability, both in terms of profitability for
managers (ROA) and return for shareholders (ROE). However, their conclusions
seem to be true only for developed economies.
Dalton et al. (1996) conducted a meta-analysis investigate whether a
situation of non-duality board is related to performance, and their result reveal
suggest no relationship of a meaningful level. The latter finding is consistent
with the results of other later banking studies that reveal not significant
relationship among variables (Griffith et al., 2002; Cooper, 2009; Adnan et
al., 2011; Aebi et al., 2012; Berger et al., 2014). In particular, Griffith et al.
(2002) assert that a situation in which CEO is also the Chair of the BoD,
has no significant impact on performance because adding responsibilities do
not result in an improving in CEO’s capacity to affect performance. Cooper
(2009) finds insignificant relationship between the CEO duality and bank
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q, Economic Value Added (EVA) and
Market Value Added (MVA). Furthermore, Adnan et al. (2011) show a negative
but insignificant relationship between CEO duality and bank performance. At
last, Aebi et al. (2012) do not find that CEO duality affects buy-and-hold
returns of US banks included in their sample. Berger et al. (2012) find no
effect of CEO duality on bank default probabilities by investigating a sample
of 249 bank failures and 4021 non-default US commercial banks over the
financial crisis period (2007-2010). Figure 1.12 and 1.13 summarize findings of
a sub-sample of comparable (as concern the methodology) articles. As reported
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in the latter, the academic point of view is mainly directed to define CEO
duality as a situation to be avoided by the BoD.
Institutional perspective regarding the CEO duality is largely in line with
academic point of view. Indeed, the combination of the role of board Chair and
CEO is possible among many of the jurisdictions with one-tier board systems.
Only one-third of the jurisdictions with one-tier board systems require or
encourage the separation of the Board Chair and CEO. Four jurisdictions
require and eight jurisdictions recommend the separation of the two posts
in "comply or explain" codes (OECD, 2017). To sum up, Figure 1.8 and
1.9 report National requirements concerning the separation of the CEO and
the Chair of the board. Moreover, CRD IV states that "the chairman of
the management body in its supervisory function of an institution must not
exercise simultaneously the functions of a chief executive officer within the
same institution, unless justified by the institution and authorised by competent
authorities.” As a result, National competent authorities have duties and
responsibility in determining whether or not a situation of CEO duality can be
specifically identified as banks’ value creator. Nonetheless, there is still a lot
of work to do to by regulators and authorities clarify the issue CEO duality in
banks.
1.4 Board structure 39
F
ig
ur
e
1.
12
.
C
EO
du
al
ity
an
d
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
A
ut
ho
rs
’o
w
n
el
ab
or
at
io
n
40
1. The big bank theory
Into the bank Corporate Governance literature
F
ig
ur
e
1.
13
.
C
EO
du
al
ity
an
d
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
A
ut
ho
rs
’o
w
n
el
ab
or
at
io
n
1.4 Board structure 41
1.4.4 Diversity
A widely researched question in Corporate Governance literature is whether
diversity among board members affects firm performance.
Diversity on boards should improve independence, preserve minorities’
rights, and offer different point of views in boards’ meeting. Nonetheless, it
may slow down board functioning and decision provisioning (Carter et al.,
2003, 2010). Hence, literature concerning this topic is not univocal. Moreover,
it recognises that also the type of diversity seems to be crucial (Garcia-Meca
et al., 2015). In particular, most of the studies focus on gender diversity and
investigate whether a higher number of women directors can lead to better
upshots in terms of effectiveness and performance. From an agency theory
perspective, a higher number of women on the board improves independence
and board monitoring function (Carter et al., 2003; Terjesen et al., 2009).
An extensive review of diversity on corporates’ board is provided by Nielsen
and Huse (2010), contrariwise, banking literature concerning diversity is limited
and more recent. The only studies that investigate different types of diversity
in banks’ board are Hagendorff et al. (2010) and Garcia-Meca et al. (2015). In
particular, Hagendorff et al. (2010) find that diversity (and independence) mat-
ter only under strict banking regulation regimes. In particular, the authors find
that age, occupational and expertise diversity improve acquisition performance.
Contrariwise, in less strict regulatory environments, Corporate Governance is
virtually irrelevant in improving the performance outcomes of merger activities.
Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) analyse the relationship between board diversity
(interpreted as gender and as nationality) and performance on a cross-country
sample composed by 159 banks observing the period 2004-2010. They find
opposing results due to the type of diversity: gender diversity increases bank
performance; national diversity constrains it. At last, they also assert that
within weaker regulatory and lower investor protection environments board
diversity has less influence on banks’ performance. The effects of gender di-
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versity on banks performance are also investigated by a few other researchers
(Pathan and Faff, 2013; Strom et al., 2014; Nguyen et al., 2015) obtaining
mixed results.
In particular, Pathan and Faff (2013) run a GMM estimation methods
over a sample composed by 212 US BHCs and find that gender diversity has
a positive effect on bank performance in the pre-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX)
period (1997–2002), but this relationship is becoming weaker in both the
post-SOX (2003–2006) and the crisis periods (2007– 2011). They also argue
that this finding may be resulted by the consequential possibility of a reduction
of more capable male directors on board. This is consistent with Nguyen et
al. (2015). The latters analyse the issue of gender diversity in 308 US banks
from January 1999 to December 2011 by investigate the impact on market
performance and controlling for executives’ appointments announcements. As
in Pathan and Faff (2013), the authors find that gender diversity is not linked
to measurable value effects.
Contrariwise, Strom et al. (2012) find that a female CEO and a female
Chair of the board are positively related to performance of a cross-country
panel of 329 microfinance institutions in 73 countries during 1998– 2008.
As resulted by the survey conducted in this paper, gender diversity is also
being investigated to explore its effects on bank risk-taking (De Cabo and
Gimeno, 2012; Berger et al., 2014) and functioning (Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn
2011; Beck et al., 2013; Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014).
De Cabo and Gimeno (2012) investigate whether gender diversity impact on
bank risk-taking of a sample composed by 612 European banks. In particular,
the authors show three main findings: (i) a higher number of women directors
reduces bank risk-taking; (ii) board size and woman directors number are
positively related; (iii) banks with growth objectives are more prone to include
women on their board. Berger et al. (2014) use a difference-in-difference
estimation method to explore the relationship between different Corporate
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Governance characteristics (age, gender, educational composition) and bank
risk-taking, measured by the Risk Weighted Assets density (RWA/Total Assets).
Their findings show that a higher representation of women on boards improves
bank risk-avoiding, although results are not strongly significant. Furthermore,
they argue that the latter result can be explained by a women risk aversion
hypothesis.
Muller-Kahle and Lewellyn (2011) try to asses a relationship between
board composition and subprime lending, by investigating also gender diversity
issues on a sample of 74 US banks during the period 1997-2005. For what
concerns gender diversity, their results show that subprime lenders have boards
presenting a lower percentage of women directors. Beck et al. (2013) explore a
similar research question but focus to loan officers rather than bank executives.
The authors use data of a commercial bank in Albania and find a lower
likelihood to turn problematic of loans originated by female loan officers than
loans originated by male loan officers. Thus, loans screened and monitored by
female loan officers present lower default rates. The authors confer this result
to a better capacity of women to build relationship with borrowers better than
male officers. At last, Chakrabarty and Bass (2014) investigate data of 280
International microfinance institutions, to asses whether a higher presence of
women on boards may reduce banks’ operating costs. Their results confirm
the hypothesis of a positive effect of women on boards and lead the authors
to argue that microfinance institutions with high operating costs may benefit
from appointing a board with socio-economic expertise and women directors.
Standard setters started to promote diversity on board in the last decade.
In 2011 the OECD announced its Gender Initiative which suggests "The need
to introduce quotas for women in boardrooms or in senior management is being
widely debated and, conditional on data availability, deserves further analysis
to understand its benefits in terms of women’s employment outcomes and firm
performance." For what concerns banks board composition, the BCBS (2015)
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provides specific suggestions regarding diversity, that are outlined in Principle
2: "The board should be comprised of individuals with a balance of skills,
diversity and expertise, who collectively possess the necessary qualifications
commensurate with the size, complexity and risk profile of the bank." From an
Institutional perspective, gender diversity issue is being debated since 2007,
and the discussion regarding this topic is still open. On 21st November 2007,
the Committee of Ministers adopted the Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)17
of the Committee of Ministers to member states on gender equality standards
and mechanisms provided by Council of Europe provide the that among the
other suggestions regarding gender diversity, supports the "adoption/existence
and implementation of legal and administrative measures to promote women’s
equal participation in economic decision making, including implementation of
plans for gender balanced participation in boards and other decision-making
structures of economic and financial institutions and private enterprises".
Moreover, the European Parliament (EP) has called for action on gender
gaps in economic governance (EP, 2012). In particular, the EP provide a
resolution called for the EC to narrow the gender gap in the membership of
European corporate management boards. Legislative frameworks have also
been developed at a national level. Within the member States of the EU the
development of a legislatives framework improving female representation on
boards have been provided in: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Ireland, Italy, Spain and the Netherlands (Davies, 2011; EC Network, 2011;
Pande and Forde, 2011; Visser, 2011) with some differences regarding com-
panies targeted, proportion of minority gender to be represented, timetable
for implementation, sanctions for non- compliance (EP, 2012). Moreover, a
provision recommending more "diversity" in German managing and supervisory
boards has lately been included in the German Corporate Governance Code,
encouraging the appointment of women and foreign managers to management
and supervisory boards (OECD, 2017). Furthermore, non-European Union
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countries which provided similar legislative frameworks are: Norway, Iceland,
Switzerland and Israel. Concerning financial institutions, in 2011, the Com-
mittee on Economic and Monetary Affairs provided a report on the Corporate
Governance of financial institutions to suggest to European Commission an
increase of female representation on financial institutions’ boards by arguing
that "greater diversity would tend to reduce the sector’s vulnerability to crises,
contribute to stability, and improve the quality of debate and decision making."
Moreover, the EC considers the diversity on financial institutions boards
since the original proposal to strengthen the regulation of the banking sector,
replacing Capital Requirements Directives (2006/48 and 2006/49) to the last
developed Capital Requirements Directive (Directive 2013/36/EU, also known
as CRD IV) which reports in the latter version that: "The lack of monitoring by
management bodies of management decisions is partly due to the phenomenon
of ’groupthink’. This phenomenon is, inter alia, caused by a lack of diversity
in the composition of management bodies. To facilitate independent opinions
and critical challenge, management bodies of institutions should therefore
be sufficiently diverse as regards age, gender, geographical provenance and
educational and professional background to present a variety of views and
experiences. [. . . ] More diverse management bodies should more effectively
monitor management and therefore contribute to improved risk oversight and
resilience of institutions. Therefore, diversity should be one of the criteria
for the composition of management bodies. Diversity should also be addressed
in institutions’ recruitment policy more generally. Such a policy should, for
instance, encourage institutions to select candidates from shortlists including
both genders." As a result, the view point of a need to improve and preserve
diversity on boards is shared by both standard setters and regulators and is
also in line with most of the papers surveyed in this research. However, even
thought academics focus on diversity of corporates’ boards since the last decade
of XX century (Nielsen and Huse, 2010) forestalling both standard setters
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and regulators, for what concerns financial institutions, the development of
suggestions and guidance is receiving growing attention of standard setters
and regulators along with academics findings.
1.5 Risk Management
Banks are in the business of taking risks. Moreover, bank board character-
istics are a crucial factor of bank risk-taking (Rachdi et al., 2013).
Since the crisis, risk management function has received increasing attention
due to its decisive role in risk-avoiding, that has been revealed to be insufficient
and weak. Thus, banking regulatory bodies have responded, proposing long
overdue principles of good Corporate Governance (McConnell, 2011).
In particular, National authorities have taken several measures to improve
regulatory and supervisory oversight of risk governance at financial institutions
so as to ensure sound risk governance through changing environments and
tightening up on the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors. These
measures include developing or strengthening existing regulation or guidance,
raising supervisory expectations for the risk management function, engaging
more frequently with the board and management, and assessing the accuracy
and usefulness of the information provided to the board to enable effective
discharge of their responsibilities (FSB, 2013).
The second pillar of Basel II identifies the role of the board as an integral
aspect of risk management, therefore aligning the internal governance structure
in the light of comprehensive risk management approach seemed like an imme-
diate need. Two of the most important internal governance mechanisms which
support the comprehensive risk management framework are the establishment
of an independent Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and/or RM Committee that will
have an oversight responsibility for all risks undertaken by the bank.
Aebi et al. (2012), using data on 573 US banks over the crises period (1st
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July 2007 to 31st December 2008), investigate whether risk management-related
Corporate Governance mechanisms, made banks perform better during the
financial crisis of 2007/2008. In particular, they examine if the presence of a
CRO in a bank’s executive board and whether the CRO reports to the CEO or
directly to the BoD, are associated with a better bank performance measured by
buy-and-hold-returns and ROE, controlling for various Corporate Governance
characteristics (CEO ownership, board size, and board independence). Findings
reported in their paper show that banks, in which the CRO directly reports to
the BoD and not to the CEO, performed significantly better in terms of both
performance measures. A similar result is provided by Ellul and Yerramilli
(2013). They explore the implication of a strong and independent RM to
bank risk-taking and performance using a sample of 74 large US BHCs over
the period 1995–2010. They construct a Risk Management Index (RMI),
which is based on five variables related to the strength of a bank’s RM (CRO
Present, a dummy variable that identifies if the BHC has a designated CRO;
CRO Executive, a dummy variable that identifies if the CRO is an executive
officer; CRO-Top5, a dummy variable that identifies if the CRO is among the
five highest paid executives; and CRO Centrality, defined as the ratio of the
CRO’s total compensation to the CEO’s total compensation). The authors
find that banks with a higher RMI value in 2006 performed better in the crisis
period than others, and were also less risky. Their conclusions are supported
by lower tail risk and lower level of NPLs for better risk-managed banks in
2006. Zagorchev and Gao (2015) use 41 factors of the RiskMetrics’ Corporate
Governance index (CG41) to examine how Corporate Governance affects US
financial institutions over the period 2002-2009. The authors find a negative
relationship between better governance and excessive risk-taking (proxied by
non-performing assets and real estate non-performing assets). Moreover, their
results also support a positive association between better governance and
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q). Keys et al. (2009) find that larger
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relative power for the CRO (measured by CRO compensation divided by the
amount of compensation given to the top five paid executives) implies lower
default rates on loans (mortgages and home equity loans). Mongiardino and
Plath (2010) investigate the role of independent directors in RM. According to
this study risk governance requires (1) a dedicated board-level risk committee,
of which (2) a majority should be independent, and (3) that the CRO should
be part of the bank’s executive board.
Based on a survey among 20 large banks, they find that only a small
number of banks followed these guidelines in 2007. Most risk committees were
not comprised of enough independent and financially knowledgeable members.
Similarly, Kanagaretnam et al. (2010) examine auditor independence in the
banking industry by analysing the relation between fees paid to auditors and
the extent of earnings management through loan loss provisions. They find that
especially relating to small banks, auditor fee dependence on the audit client is
associated with earnings management via abnormal loan loss provisions. Thus,
the authors also suggest to policymakers to contemplate new regulations in
light of the banking crisis. A complementary view is provided by Barakat and
Hussainey (2013) who recommend to enhance risk disclosures by establishing
independent specialized national committees or task forces to monitor and
advise Pillar 3 disclosures in banks.
As a matter of fact, academic literature still presents mixed result, fur-
thermore, "there exist fundamental risk-incentive mechanisms that operate in
exactly the opposite direction" (Boyd et al., 2005). Furthermore, the diversity
among financial system institutions lead to different risks faced by banks,
supporting the unlikeliness to apply a single instrument of financial stability
policy (Ellis et al., 2014).
In order to assess the progress of national authorities and the banking
industry in the area of risk governance since the global financial crisis, the
FSB issued a Thematic review on risk governance in February 2013 as part
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of its series of peer reviews. The peer review found that financial institutions
and national authorities have taken measures to improve risk governance. In
particular, in the latter is argued that "the board has ultimate responsibility for
the firm’s risk management, including setting the risk culture of the firm and
overseeing management’s implementation of the agreed business strategy. The
board of directors sets the tone from the top, and seeks to effectively inculcate
an appropriate risk culture throughout the firm." Nonetheless, standard setters’
attention and awareness to this issue is being given mostly since the early
aftermath of the last financial crises. For example, OECD (2009) states:
"Perhaps one of the greatest shocks from the financial crisis has been the
widespread failure of risk management. In many cases risk was not managed on
an enterprise basis and not adjusted to corporate strategy. Risk managers were
often kept separate from management and not regarded as an essential part
of implementing the company’s strategy. Most important of all, boards were
in a number of cases ignorant of the risk facing the company." EBA (2011)
states that an institution shall develop an integrated and institution-wide risk
culture, based on a full understanding of the risks it faces and how they are
managed, taking into account its risk tolerance/appetite.
Assigning the role of risk management to a board-level committee is be-
coming more common among large companies, notably in the financial sector
(OECD, 2017). From an Institutional perspective, the EP (2013) encourages
Member States to introduce principles and standards to ensure effective over-
sight by the management body, promote a sound risk culture at all levels of
credit institutions and investment firms and enable competent authorities to
monitor the adequacy of internal governance arrangements. Finally, "Member
States shall [. . . ] ensure that institutions have a risk management function
independent from the operational functions and which shall have sufficient
authority, stature, resources and access to the management body. Member
States shall ensure that the risk management function ensures that all material
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risks are identified, measured and properly reported. They shall ensure that the
risk management function is actively involved in elaborating the institution’s
risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions and that it can
deliver a complete view of the whole range of risks of the institution." (CRD
IV). However, more work is needed by both national authorities and banks to
establish effective risk governance frameworks and to enumerate expectations
for third-party reviews of the framework. Banks also need to enhance the
authority and independence of CROs. National authorities need to strengthen
their ability to assess the effectiveness of a bank’s risk governance and its risk
culture and should engage more frequently with the board and its risk and
audit committees (BCBS, 2015). CEOs are key decision makers. In particular,
their risk propensity has a decisive role in the definition of the strategy of
the bank (Adams and Ferreira, 2007). As a consequence, their position has a
strong effect on both bank risk and performance. However, empirical research
on the impact of CEO duality on banks’ risks (Simpson and Gleason, 1999;
Pathan, 2009, Boujelbène and Nabila, 2011, De Jonghe et al., 2012, Rachdi
et al., 2013; Cornelli et al., 2013) provide different conclusion and most of
the findings are not supported by sufficient significance. Gender diversity is
also being investigated to explore its effects on bank risk-taking (De Cabo
and Gimeno, 2012; Berger et al., 2014) and functioning (Muller-Kahle and
Lewellyn 2011; Beck et al., 2013; Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014).
Finally, as concerns risk management, Keys et al. (2009), Aebi et al. (2012)
and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) find that banks in which the Chief Risk Officer
directly reports to the board of directors and not to the Chief Executive Officer
performed significantly better in terms of both performance and risk measures.
Mongiardino and Plath (2010) governance requires (1) a dedicated board-level
risk committee, of which (2) a majority should be independent, and (3) that
the CRO should be part of the bank’s executive board.
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Figure 1.14. Governance of internal control and RM
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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Figure 1.15. Governance of internal control and RM (cont.d)
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
L=requirement by the law or regulations R=requirement by the listing rule
C=recommendation by the codes or principles "-"=absence of a specific require-
ment or recommendation
1.6 Ownership structure
Ownership structure is a widely researched topic in Corporate Governance
literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). The topic was initially introduced
inspected by Berle and Means (1932), whose study points out the issue of
the separation of ownership and control, being "concerned with the survival
of organizations in which important decision agents do not bear a substantial
share of the wealth effects of their decisions"8. They also discover that firms’
performance is negatively affected by a diffuse ownership structure.
Concerning this issue, the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976)
identifies managers as the agents whose function is to maximize sharehold-
ers’ interests, recognised as principals. In a situation of separation between
ownership and control, agents, who are not owners of the firm, may commit
‘moral hazards’ since their interests are not aligned with those of principals
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This view is consistent with Jensen (1983b)
who also identifies two different solutions in order to solve principal-agency
problems. One is to align principals and agents’ risk-taking and the other is to
enhance the monitoring of ownership structure. Indeed, agency theorists have
8Fama, Eugene F., and Michael C. Jensen. "Separation of ownership and control." Journal
of law and economics (1983b): 301-325.
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long considered concentrated ownership as a governance mechanism that may
reduce agency costs (Glassman and Rhoades, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Nonetheless, the effect of the separation of ownership and control has been left
undetermined and is still focus of debate.
In particular, researches related to ownership structure can be in turn
divided in two different strands of literature. A first subfield deals in ownership
concentration, the other is focused on owners’ type. Concerning the first
dimension, one of the studies who investigate the empirical relationship between
ownership concentration and profitability in banks is Shehzad et al. (2010)
which results show that concentrated ownership has a significant positive effect
on bank risk-avoiding. Indeed, the authors, use a sample composed by 500
cross-country banks over the period 2005-2007 and find that a higher level of
concentration lead to a reduction of NPLs ratio. Similarly, Adnan et al. (2011)
investigate the efficiency of Malaysian listed banks during 1997-1998, trying to
link it with banks’ ownership structure. The authors, using a GLS multivariate
regression, find that block ownership lead to better efficiency of Malaysian
banks, as measured by both the ratios between NPLs and total loans and
between operating expenses and total assets. They also justify this result by
arguing that the significance of concentrated ownership could suggest better
monitoring by the block-holders. This is consistent with Azofra and Santamaria
(2011) who investigate Spanish banks. Lately, Grove et al. (2011) do not
provide much support that concentrated ownership lead to positive effects on
banks performance. Indeed, the authors find a weak association between the two
variables. Contrariwise, Beltratti and Stulz (2012) show a strong relationship
between concentrated ownership and bank risk-taking especially during the
recent financial crisis in US. Following this view, Busta et al. (2014) focusing on
data of European banks over the period 1993–2005, find a negative relationship
between ownership concentration and banks market value. In particular, they
use a GMM dynamic estimator that lead them to find a negative effect of
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ownership concentration on banks Tobin’s Q. Nonetheless, their major finding
is that the obtained results varies across different institutional settings. Indeed,
the negative effect is particularly strong in countries belonging to Germany,
France or Common law legal tradition, contrariwise, the authors find a positive
effect of concentration on Scandinavian banks. Busta et al. (2014) argues
that these differences could derive by the identity of the predominant owners
(financial institutions and family in the first group, trusts and foundations in
Scandinavia).
Actually, as above mentioned, owners’ type matter. The first study resulted
by the research conducted that is related on this issue is Saunders et al. (1990).
The authors show that stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher
risk-taking behaviour than managerially controlled banks during the 1979-
1982 period of relative deregulation. Lately, Anderson and Fraser (2000)
investigate whether or not managerial shareholdings affect banks risk-taking of
an International sample observed in the period 1987-1994. Their results show
a strong a positive observation of the analysed variables, although they present
some differences in the period 1980s, due to the financial distress and the less
level of bank regulation. This is also in line with Chen et al. (1998), arguing that
as managerial ownership increases, the level of risk-taking decreases. Consistent
are also Anderson and Fraser (2000) and Kabigting (2011). The latter finds that
insider ownership has significant positive relationship with ROA, bank size and
Earning Per Share (EPS). Lee (2002) uses a sample of 65 US BHCs observed
over the period 1987–1996. His results show a negative relationship between
risk (measured by the probability of failure) and shareholding of managers.
Westman (2011) inspects a sample composed by 477 European traditional and
non-traditional banks over 2000–2006 and finds directors’ ownership positively
affecting traditional banks profitability, whereas management ownership has a
similar effect in non traditional banks sample. At last, Berger et al. (2012) by
looking for a relationship between different Corporate Governance drivers and
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US commercial banks risk, provide evidence that banks’ probability of default
is strongly and negatively affected by insider ownership. Fahlenbrach and Stulz
(2011) find that higher insider ownership and higher sensitivity of CEO wealth
to bank performance represent better alignment of interests. Indeed, there is a
strand of literature regarding banks ownership, trying to asses specifically the
association of CEO ownership and bank efficiency, obtaining mixed results. For
instance, Pathan (2009) find statistically significant and positive coefficients
regressing bank risks (total risk, idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk) over
CEO ownership percentage. This result can be justified by showing that as the
percentage of bank CEOs shareholdings increase, their risk preferences coincide
with bank shareholders and so increases bank risk. Berger et al. (2012) find
that high shareholdings of CEO, lead to a reduction of banks probability of
failure. This is also consistent with Aebi et al. (2012). Contrariwise, Griffith et
al. (2002) investigate the association of CEO ownership and bank performance
(measured by EVA, Tobin’s Q and MVA), applying a random effects model on
sample composed by 100 BHCs over the period 1995-1999. Conversely to Pi
and Timme (1993), the authors find a non-linear relationship between CEO
ownership and performance. Rachidi et al. (2013) find that a lower CEO
ownership has no significant effect with all measures of risks.
Another dichotomy concerning ownership structure, is related to state
owned banks and private sector institutions. As resulted by this survey, many
authors investigated this issue in the last decade. Berger et al. (2005) explore
the effects of domestic, foreign, and state ownership on bank performance
of Argentinian banks during 1990s. The authors obtained strong and robust
result showing that state owned banks have poor long-term performance (static
effect), those undergoing privatization had particularly poor performance
beforehand (selection effect), and these banks dramatically improved following
privatization (dynamic effect). Similar results are obtained by Kim and Rasiah
(2010) by exploring a sample of Malaysian banks. Barry (2011), investigate
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this issue in a sample of European banks and find that publicly held banks do
not affect risk-taking when changes in ownership structure occur. Focusing also
on a sample of European banks Iannotta et al. (2013) and try to relate state
ownership with bank risk as measure by default risk and operating risk. They
analysis show different results, one of the most relevant is that government
owned banks resulted to face lower default risk, but higher operating risk.
Altunbas et al. (2001) assess the impact of ownership structure of the efficiency
of German banks finding no agency problems for non private banks operating
within German banking market.
Recent studies investigate the relation between institutional shareholding
and bank risk-taking with results again not conclusive. Barry et al. (2011),
Erkens et al. (2012), Cheng et al. (2012) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) show
that that financial firms greater institutional ownership is associated with
increases in risk-taking strategies of banks. Contrariwise, Knopf and Teall
(1996), Booth (2002), Ferri (2009) and Cebenoyan et al. (1999) report opposing
findings, and this difference may be linked with the period of observation.
Finally, a few studies assess the impact of regulation on banks ownership
structure. In particular, Caprio et al. (2007) and Laeven and Levine (2009a;
2009b) investigate this issue and find evidence that bank regulation may
increase or decrease bank risk-taking, depending upon the ownership structure.
Levine (2004) and Barth et al. (2004) argue that regulation policies may limit
the impact of traditional governance mechanisms. The authors also point
out that Governments in many countries restrict the concentration of bank
ownership and also impose limits on the purchase of shares by outsiders without
regulatory approval.
In those companies with concentrated ownership structures, "horizontal"
agency problems that arise between controlling and minority shareholders
are the predominant concern, while "vertical" agency problems that arise
between managers and shareholders may be mitigated (Vermeulen, 2013).
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Indeed, in the last decade, even countries characterised by dispersed ownership
structures, have introduced special arrangements to address the "horizontal"
agency problems that can arise between controlling and minority shareholders
(OECD, 2017) (Table 1.3 and 1.4). As a result, still there is not a clear answer
about which is the optimal ownership structure in banks.
1.7 Compensation
Executive compensation is a hot subject for researchers especially in the
aftermath of 2007/2008 financial crises (OECD, 2015). Indeed, there is a wide
consensus in the literature regarding executive compensation that its level and
composition may increase the risk-taking behaviour of bank managers (Houston
and James, 1995; Adams and Mehran, 2003; Webb, 2008; Bebchuk et al., 2010;
Gropp and Kohler, 2010; John et al., 2010; Grove et al., 2011; Cheng et al.,
2012; DeYoung et al., 2013; Chaigneau, 2013). This is the reason why both
principle setter and regulators identify it as a critical issue in banks’ soundness
and stability. Moreover, executive compensation has also become a topic of
intense debate among principles setters (e.g. OCSE, 2015; 2017; BCBS, 2015;
EBA, 2015), regulators (e.g. EP, 2013) and media (e.g. Rajan, 2008; Rajan
et al. 2008; Kyrkpatric, 2009), with a particular focus on CEO compensation
(Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Chen et al. 2006; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011;
Thanassoulis, 2011; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Tian and Yang, 2014)
Remuneration structure, and in particular, executive compensation, is one
of the most debated topic in Corporate Governance literature of both firms
and financial institutions. Also principle setters discuss about this subject in
detail defining remuneration as a practice supporting Corporate Governance
soundness (OECD, 2004; 2015; BCBS, 2010; 2015). Moreover, to achieve
soundness it is emphasised that remuneration policy should be focused on the
longer run interests of the company over short term considerations (OECD,
58
1. The big bank theory
Into the bank Corporate Governance literature
Table 1.3. Ownership structures at company level
Country Ownership structure
Australia A majority of shares in top 200 listed companies are in the hands of financial institu-
tions, but their holdings are typically dispersed.
Austria Direct ownership concentration is very high and prevalent in all size classes in Austria.
In the largest 5% of companies the largest shareholder holds on average 67% of the
equity.
Belgium About 60% of listed companies have a shareholder who, alone or in concert, hold more
than 30% of the voting.
Brazil A large majority of listed firms are controlled by a single shareholder, foreign firms or
via pyramidal structures involving corporate groups. Over 70% of the firms had either
family or shared ownership control.
Canada About 25% of the largest 300 TSX listed-firms have a controlling shareholder.
Chile As of 2002, some 50 major conglomerates had ownership control of more than 70% of
non-financial listed companies.
China By the end of June 2016, there were 2,887 listed companies in China, 1,019 of which
were state-controlled.
Colombia Colombian companies have a highly concentrated ownership structure.
Czech Republic The structure of ownership can be characterised by concentrated ownership usually in
the hands of a controlling shareholder.
Denmark Many large companies in the Nordic area have a dispersed ownership structure. How-
ever, a relatively large portion of the listed companies in the Nordic area have one or
a few controlling shareholders.
Estonia 7 out of the 15 listed companies are in the hands of one controlling shareholder.
Finland The ownership structure is decentralised in some companies, while others have share-
holders with significant voting rights.
France For all listed companies, the largest shareholder directly held 46% of the capital and
52% of the voting rights (1998-2002). Double voting rights were used by 36% of listed
firms as a device of control-enhancing.
Germany The ownership structure of listed companies is quite dualistic. While a significant
number of enterprises are under tight control, in many cases, shares are broadly dis-
tributed.
Greece Regarding the banking sector, listed banks are mainly characterised by dispersed own-
ership.
Hong Kong, China About 75% of issuers have a dominant shareholder, for example, an individual/family
or state-owned entity owning 30% or more of the issued shares (2012).
Hungary Amongst listed companies, both concentrated ownership and dispersed structures can
be found. The average size of the free-float is about 47%.
India India is characterised by the widespread use of company groups, often in the form of
pyramids with a wide basis and with a number of levels.
Indonesia A survey of 186 listed firms found that on average 70% of the shares were held by
controlling shareholders, and 58% of firms were family-controlled (2006-2007).
Ireland Ireland have few family-controlled companies and widely dispersed ownership.
Israel About 75% of listed companies are controlled by family or individual interests.
Italy Nearly 2/3 of listed companies are controlled by a single shareholder. The presence
of widely held companies is still limited. There is a sharp decline of the pyramid
structure, shareholders agreements and non-voting shares in the last decade, possibly
as a reaction to increasing market pressure.
Japan Less than 10% of TSE listed companies have a shareholder with more than 50% of the
shares. Approximately two-thirds of TSE listed companies have a shareholder with
more than 10% of the shares.
Latvia The majority of listed companies have concentrated ownership.
Korea 38 family-owned large company groups own 1 364 companies. Out of them, 213 are
listed on the Korean stock market, and 51.8% of the total shares are owned by con-
trolling shareholders.
Mexico Listed companies are characterised by a high degree of concentration. Company groups
are the common feature in the market, and many of them are owned by family groups.
Netherlands The Netherlands has a more dispersed ownership structure than most continental
European countries.
Authors’ own elaboration on OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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Table 1.4. Ownership structures at company level (cont.d)
Country Ownership structure
New Zealand New Zealand has few very large firms, and considerable parts of the
largest firms are either government or co-operative owned, or controlled
by offshore owners.
Norway Among listed companies, 65% have a shareholder with at least a 20%
stake, and 23% have at least 50% control.
Poland 30-60% of shares belong to the controlling shareholders and 15-20% is
held by pension funds or investment funds.
Portugal A key feature of the listed firms is the dominance of controlling (often
family) shareholders. In 24 out of 53 listed companies, a single shareholder
owns a majority stake.
Russia About 43% of 96 major listed companies have an owner or a group of
interrelated owners holding 75% of company shares in 2014 (Russian
Institute of Directors survey, 2015-2016).
Singapore The majority of listed companies in Singapore have a block shareholder
holding of 15% or more. The ownership structure comprises two main
types; companies that originally started off as (i) family-owned businesses
and (ii) state owned enterprises.
Slovenia Ownership of listed companies is concentrated as the principal three
owners own on average 61% . The Government has significant direct and
indirect control over a large number of sizeable companies in the domestic
market.
South Africa A majority of South African listed companies are characterised as having
a controlling owner or shareholders.
Spain In 35 listed companies (25,5% of the total) there is a controlling shareholder
that holds the majority of voting rights. In 91 other listed companies
(66% of the total), the sum of declared significant shareholdings, including
shareholdings held by the Board, exceeds 50% of share capital, without
any individual shareholder exercising control. Total free float climbed to
43,4% in 2015 (42,9% in 2014).
Sweden The control to a large extent lies in the hands of domestic family groups, in
different constellations, or other block holders. About 64% of listed firms
have one shareholder with at least a 25% shareholding. State ownership
is also quite significant.
Switzerland Among the 20 SMI companies, 6 companies have one or more shareholders
holding more than 15% of the voting rights in shares or in purchase
positions as of July 4, 2016. With regard to medium and smaller companies,
the share of controlling shareholders (25-30% of the shares) is higher.
Turkey The majority of listed companies are in the form of family controlled
financial/industrial company groups and there is a limited degree of
cross-ownership within some company groups.
United Kingdom The UK has a highly liquid listed company sector with dispersed ownership.
In about 90% of companies listed on the LSE, there is no major shareholder
owning 25% or more.
United States Ownership of public companies is generally characterised by dispersed
shareholdings. Listed companies are rarely under the control of a major
shareholder but rather subject to managerial control. One study describes
how most public corporations in the United States have large shareholders,
by taking into account the ownership both of directors and officers and
all large shareholders.
Authors’ own elaboration on OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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2004; 2015; BCBS, 2010; 2015). Referring in particular to financial institutions,
BCBS asserts that remuneration structure is also linked to bank risk-taking
behaviour9, furthermore it should be in line with the business and risk strategy,
objectives.
As a result of the survey conducted in this paper, executive compensation is
a hot subject for researchers especially in the aftermath of 2007/2008 financial
crisis. This is also denoted by academicians and principle setters. For example,
OECD (2017) affirms that "since the financial crisis, much attention has
been paid to the governance of the remuneration of board members and key
executives".
Indeed, most of the literature regarding executive compensation in our
sample was developed from 2011. Moreover, executive compensation has also
become a topic of intense debate among principles setters (e.g. OCSE, 2015;
2017; BCBS, 2015; EBA, 2015), regulators (e.g. EP, 2013), and media (e.g.
Rajan, 2008; Rajan et al. 2008), with a particular focus on CEO compensation.
Nonetheless, the evidence linking compensation practices to the effect on
banks’ risks and performance is mixed.
Focusing on an agency theory perspective, executive compensation and
especially its variable part, is usually identified as one of the mechanism
used to align managers’ and shareholders’ interests as well as to enhance
executives’ performance (Berle and Means, 1932; Holmstrom, 1979; Grossman
and Hart, 1983; Murphy, 1985). Moreover, following this theory an executive
compensation structure is optimal when managers are motivated to encourage
only risk increasing but positive NPV projects (Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985).
From an opposite perception, the development of the literature outlines
the managerial power theory that states that the composition of incentive pay
9"Remuneration systems form a key component of the governance and incentive structure
through which the board and senior management promote good performance, convey acceptable
risk- taking behaviour and reinforce the bank’s operating and risk culture" (BCBS, 2015).
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is perceived as a mechanism that misalign executives’ interests from those of
shareholders (Bebchuk et al., 2010). Indeed, as further investigated, there
is a wide consensus in the literature regarding executive compensation that
its level and composition may increase the risk-taking behaviour of bank
managers. This is the reason why both principle setter and regulators identify
it as a critical issue in banks’ soundness and stability. In particular, it should
include procedures to avoid conflicts of interest and should also encourages
employees to act in the interest of the company as a whole. Moreover, incentives
embedded within remuneration structures should not promote excessive risk-
taking (BCBS, 2015). As noted above, a wide strand of the literature states
that higher (potential) compensation in banking institutions lead to higher
risk-taking behaviour (Houston and James, 1995; Adams and Mehran, 2003).
Moreover, executives’ incentives have also been identified as a driver of the
recent financial crises of 2008 by several scholars (e.g., Kashyap et al., 2008;
Kyrkpatric, 2009; Bebchuk et al., 2010).
Consistent with the managerial power theory, Cheng et al. (2012) investigate
a sample of financial firms during the period 1990-2008 and find that banks
posing higher compensation packages result to be riskier. Following this view,
Gropp and Kohler (2010) show that in their sample consisting of 1100 banks
from 25 OECD countries from 2000 to 2008, aligning the interests of managers
and shareholders increases risk-taking of banks. Nonetheless, as a matter
of fact, the most important determinant of the effect of compensation is its
composition. Indeed, many of the studies resulted by this survey are consistent
with the view that on the one hand equity linked pay encourages risk- taking,
contrariwise non-equity linked pay makes CEOs more risk-averse.
As concerns equity linked CEO compensation, there may be a moral hazard
behaviour since these practices combine unlimited upside with limited downside
potential risk, resulting in convex CEO pay-off linkage with marginal increases
in bank risk. DeYoung et al. (2013) find a rapid increase of equity-linked
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compensation in US banking over the last decade and show that this practice is
more linked with higher risk in financial institution than in any other industry.
Moreover, the author state that CEO compensation was changed to encourage
executives to exploit new growth opportunities created by deregulation and
debt securitization, but this is also a reason to incur in an increasing risk-
taking behaviour. In particular, banks’ risk is measured by pay-performance
sensitivity (delta), which is related to stock grants, and pay-risk sensitivity
(vega), which is related to stock options grants. Findings of the authors asses
that non-traditional banking income is strictly related to vega compensation.
Similarly, Bai and Elyasiani (2013) use CEO compensation sensitivity to
risk (vega) and pay-share inequality between the CEO and other executives as
measures of compensation. They aim to investigate the relationship between
default risk and executive compensation for BHCs over the 1992–2008 period.
Some of the most important findings deriving by their analysis are: CEO
compensation sensitivity to risk of BHCs has risen in response to deregulation;
higher CEO compensation sensitivity to risk lead to greater bank instability;
the association between bank stability and managerial compensation is bi-
directional; higher vegas induce greater risk and vice versa.
As mentioned above, regulating compensation structure is also a vital
element in the risk-taking behaviour of bank executives. In particular, Webb
(2008) states that executive bank risk-taking due to remuneration structure is
largely avoided when regulatory monitoring is high. Hence, strict regulatory
framework is needed to preserve bank stability.
Chaigneau (2013) analyses the effects of two regulatory mechanisms, namely
a regulation of the structure of bank CEOs incentive pay and sanctions for
the CEOs of failed banks, on bank risk-shifting. The author argues that the
current regulatory approach, which largely attempts to align the interests of
bank CEOs with those of their shareholders, is flawed. Moreover, Chaigneau
(2013) also suggests that banks’ Corporate Governance arrangements could
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be well-adjusted into two alternative ways in order to ensure the efficiency
structure of bank CEOs incentives. First, the regulator could let shareholders
set both the level of pay and the level of incentives of bank CEOs, but it would
impose some constraints on the structure of their incentive pay. Second, the
regulator could threaten to punish the CEOs of failed banks. Any of these two
mechanisms would ensure (at no extra cost) that bank CEOs have efficient
risk-taking incentives, although argued that the first mechanism is more robust
to modelling assumptions and parameter uncertainty.
Chen et al. (2006), investigate the relationship between stock option plans
and risk-taking in the US banking industry. The authors study whether option-
based executive compensation is linked to risk, measuring it with the volatility
of prices. Their sample is composed by 68 banks involving 70 CEOs during
1992-2000 in US banking industry. Consistently with Bai and Elyasiani (2013),
they also find a bi-directional causality between option based compensation and
executives’ risk-taking, indeed option plans induce more risk-taking, moreover
riskier banks are also more likely to offer option based compensation. They
also point out that stock option-based compensation increased as a result of
deregulation. Their conclusions agree with John et al. (2010) that assess that
regulators need to bear in mind a new paradigm providing the appropriate
incentives/disincentives for risk-taking within compensation structure.
Different compensation policies provide different ways of aligning managerial
and shareholder interests (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Cunat and Guadalupe
(2008) investigate the effect of product market competition on the compensation
packages of banks’ executives, distinguishing the effect on total pay, estimated
fixed pay and performance-pay sensitivities, and the sensitivity of stock option
grants. Using a panel data of US banks in 1990s, they provide a difference-in-
differences estimation and find that deregulation has had a significant impact
on the level and the structure of executives’ compensation. In particular, the
variable components of pay increased along with performance-pay sensitivities
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and, at the same time, the fixed component of pay fell. Similarly, Mehran
and Rosenberg (2008) report a significant impact of pay-risk sensitivity on
risk-taking (measured respectively by volatility of stock returns and write
downs).
Contrariwise, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find no evidence of the rela-
tionship between bank performance and both CEO incentives (and ownership)
during the credit crisis, furthermore the poor performance of banks during
the crisis was the result of unforeseen risk. The authors investigate a sample
of 98 financial firms, of which 95 are banks over the period 2006-2008. In
particular, they study whether US banks with CEOs, whose incentives were
better aligned with the interests of their shareholders, performed better during
the crisis. Their findings show that the banks in the sample performed worse
both in terms of stock returns and in terms of ROE.
Closely to Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), Erkens et al. (2012) find that
banks which performance was worse during the financial crisis are those offering
non-equity based pay for their CEOs.
An unclear view of the association between executives’ compensation and
bank performance is given by Grove et al. (2011) and by Acrey et al. (2011).
The first authors apply agency theory to the banking industry and adopt the
factor structure by Larcker et al. (2007) to measure multiple dimensions of
Corporate Governance for 236 US public commercial banks during the financial
crisis. They investigate the effect of executive compensation on both banks’
financial performance and loan quality, obtaining mixed result. Indeed, they
find that the extent of incentive executive pay is positively associated with
financial performance (measured by ROA of 2006 and 2007 and excess stock
return of 2006), but it is negatively associated with loan quality (measured by
the non-performing assets ratio of the average of the 2006–2008 period). They
also capture the consequences of the mismatch between incentive systems and
RM with a lack of risk adjusted financial targets in executive compensation.
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From another perspective with similar results, Luo (2015) examines the
determinants of executive compensation in Chinese banking during 2005–2012.
The author runs both a 2 Squared Least Stages (2SLS) methods and a dy-
namic GMM regressions obtaining positive but no significant relationship with
pay performance of CEOs although his result show that ownership structure
(measured by ownership concentration and ownership identification) and com-
pensation committee are significant in determining the amount of executive
compensation.
Actually, a wide compensation practice is to link CEO payment to bank
performance (Minnick et al., 2011). More specifically, this kind of cash bonus is
usually payable when earnings-based targets over at least one year are achieved
and the payoff increases up to a maximum cap. Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003)
investigate compensation strategies of commercial BHCs during 1992–2000.
One of their findings show that pay-for-performance sensitivities are strongly
larger for BHCs that have entered the underwriting business. Furthermore, and
consistent with agency theory, the authors find also that pay-for-performance
sensitivities decline generally at BHCs as return variability increases. Con-
tinuing to follow an agency theory perspective, Cornett et al. (2009) look
for a relationship between different Corporate Governance mechanisms and
both bank earnings and earnings management by investigating data of the
largest publicly traded BHCs in the US. During their analysis, they find that
the estimation of the three variables was biased by high endogeneity. Thus,
they continue their study by using a simultaneous equation approach and find
that CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity, board independence, and capital
are positively related to earnings and that earnings, board independence, and
capital are negatively related to earnings management. In particular, as con-
cerns pay-for-performance, the authors find interesting results: it is positively
related to both earnings management and board independence, and the latter
relationship is bidirectional. Also John et al. (2003) investigate the relation-
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ship between pay-for-performance sensitivity of bank CEO compensation by
using a sample composed by 143 BHCs over the period 1993-2007. Their
analysis show that performance based compensation is negatively related to
the leverage ratio and positively related to monitoring intensity by a bank
supervisor and subordinated debt holders. Livne et al. (2011) investigate the
role of Fair Value Accounting (FVA) outcomes in determining compensation
amount of US bank CEOs, finding a positive link between CEOs cash bonus
and fair value (FV) accounting of both Held For Trading (HFT) (managed
for short-term profit) and Available For Sale (AFS) assets. Hagendorff and
Vallascas (2011) investigate the link between CEO cash bonuses and bank
risks by using the Merton distance to default model on a sample composed
by US and European firms. They find that increases in CEO cash bonuses
lower the default probability of banks. Moreover, the authors find also that
the risk-reducing effect of CEO cash bonuses is mainly related to stronger
regulatory environments and for non-distressed financial institutions. Similarly,
Acrey et al. (2011) investigate the relationship between CEO compensation
and bank default risk. They focus in particular on short term incentives to
study if the latter could determine higher bank risk-taking. The authors use
early warning off-site surveillance parameters and Expected Default Frequency
(EDF) as well as crisis-related risky bank activities, and find that although
compensation elements commonly thought to be the riskiest components (e.g.
options and bonuses) are either insignificant or negatively correlated with
common risk variables, and only positively significant in predicting the level of
trading assets and securitization income. Contrariwise, Thanassoulis (2011)
applying a theoretical model calibrated on US banking system data, demon-
strates that overall remuneration represents a substantial expense for a bank
which therefore contributes to default risk significantly. Lastly, the author
suggests that cap on the proportion of the balance sheet which can be used for
remuneration can lower bank default risk. Tian and Yang (2014) also focus
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on incentive pay of US banking CEOs and find a positive association with
bank risk-taking. In particular, they investigate a sample composed by 179
financial institutions over the period 2005-2010 and distinguish commercial
banks from non-commercial financial institutions (respectively 123 and 56), and
find a trend for commercial bank CEOs to switch from cash bonuses into other
forms of incentive compensation, if more desirable. Bhagat and Bolton (2014)
conduct a study on 14 of the largest financial institutions during 2000–2008.
They focus different on features of CEO compensation (CEO’s purchases and
sales of their bank’s stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses CEOs
incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008) and consider three
measures of risk-taking (Z-score, the banks’ asset write-downs, and whether or
not a bank borrows capital from FED bailout programs, and the amount of
such capital). Their results agree with the analysis of Bebchuk et al. (2010)
and assess the correlation between incentives generated by executive compen-
sation programs and excessive risk-taking by bank. The authors also propose
a compensation structure for senior bank executives: executive incentive re-
muneration should only contain restricted stock and restricted stock options.
This kind of structure will properly fit the long-term incentives of the senior
executives with the interests of the stockholders. Even though most of the
literature regarding executives’ compensation in banking is especially referred
to CEOs, a few recent studies (Keys et al., 2009; Aebi et al., 2012; Ellul and
Yerramilli, 2013) are focused also on Chief Risk Officers (CROs) compensation
in order to determine whether risk managers’ activity effectiveness is related
to a high level of compensation. This is the reason why the latters are deeper
reviewed in the above presented risk management section.
To sum up, both standard setters and regulators pay attention to executives’
compensation, due to the need of concern and awareness regarding this issue.
The ability of the board to effectively oversee executive remuneration appears
to be a key challenge in practice and remains one of the central elements of the
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Corporate Governance debate in a number of jurisdictions. Implementation of
the OECD Principles thus remains a challenge (OECD, 2010). Indeed, the ear-
lier attention of standard setters is given by OECD (2009) stating: "Depending
on the characteristics of the company, remuneration and incentive systems that
should be the focus of board (and sometimes regulatory) oversight need to be
considered broadly and not just focused on the chief executive officer and board
members. [. . . ] It should be considered good practice that remuneration policies
are submitted to the annual meeting and as appropriate subject to shareholder
approval." and continuing with a suggestion to financial institutions: "Finan-
cial institutions are advised to follow the Principles for Sound Compensation
Practices issued by the Financial Stability Forum. [(2009)]". Focusing on
banks, BCBS (2010) in the first edition of its Principles for Enhancing Cor-
porate Governance developed suggestions regarding compensation and link
compensation systems to both bank performance and risk. The Committee
in the same year also provided the Compensation Principles and Standards
Assessment Methodology10 so as to "guide supervisors in reviewing individual
firms’ compensation practices and assessing their compliance with the FSB
Principles and Standards, and seeks to foster supervisory approaches that are
effective in promoting sound compensation practices at banks and help support
a level playing field."
From an institutional perspective, the EC issued legislative proposals to
grant shareholders the right to vote on remuneration policy and the remunera-
tion report (EC, 2014). Moreover, the CRD IV approved by the EP in 2013
impose a cap on banking executives’ incentives. Indeed, many jurisdictions
have adopted rules on prior shareholder approval of equity-based incentive
schemes for board members and key executives. More recently, EBA (2015)
provide a draft of its Guidelines to set out the governance process for imple-
menting sound remuneration policies across the EU and also aim to identify
10Compensation Principles and Standards Assessment Methodology, Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, January 2010.
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specific criteria for mapping all remuneration components into either fixed
or variable pay. At a national level, United Kingdom (2002) introduced a
non-binding shareholder vote on executive compensation "Say-on-Pay", which
one of the main aims was to improve performance linkage of executive pay. This
practice was also followed by US (2010) and Australia (2011). Furthermore,
in UK new rules came into force in September 2013, where publicly traded
companies are required to submit the company’s remuneration policy report
for a binding shareholder vote at least every three years. Figure 1.16 and
1.17 summarise National requirements or recommendations for board and key
executives’ remuneration.
To sum up, there has been a rich policy effort to entail firms, and especially
banks to achieve a more long- term-oriented awareness regarding compensation
structure and also a better-defined performance based view to reduce excessive
risk-taking, as a response to the financial crisis.
1.8 Conclusion
The main findings of this paper lead to assert that there is an increasing
understanding of the fundamentals of bank Corporate Governance such as
board structure, committees, risk management, and ownership structure. This
result stands out from both banking and institutional perspective. Indeed,
authorities have developed several measures with the aim of strengthening
risk management regulation, and assessing the accuracy and usefulness of
information provided to and from banks’ directors also by engaging more
frequently with board and management. Notwithstanding this, standard
setters and regulators tend to focus respectively on what the board should do
and must do and the necessary competences of board members as opposed
to structural characteristics (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2010;
FSB, 2013; Directive 2013/36/EU or CRD IV; Bank of Italy, 2008) (Brogi,
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Figure 1.16. Governance of internal control and RM
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
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Figure 1.17. Governance of internal control and RM (cont.d)
OECD (2017), Corporate Governance factbook
L=requirement by the law or regulations, R=requirement by the listing rule,
C=recommendation by the codes or principles "-"=absence of a specific requirement or
recommendation
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2011).
Nonetheless, there is still a lot of work to do to implement sound Corpo-
rate Governance. This paper examines the developments of bank Corporate
Governance literature trying to shed some light on the causality dilemma
between theory and practice, by investigating whether or not the progress of
regulation and supervision in the area of bank governance follows academic
findings or viceversa. There is a ong term supervisory perspective resulted by
the investigation of the literature the purpose of banks’ Corporate Governance
is less to safeguard shareholders and investors, but to safeguard depositors and
other debtholders.
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Chapter 2
Better safe than sorry
Will the single rulebook on bank CG prevent excessive risk taking?
Abstract: Conventional wisdom leads to assert that good governance may
underpin bank performance while bad governance destroys stability/soundness.
Moreover, strong externalities on the economy make bank Corporate Governance
a fundamental issue. The European Commission pursued a number of initiatives
to create a safer and sounder financial sector for the single market and to restore
confidence in banks.
This set of rules is intended to build a single rulebook for financial intermediaries
in the EU28. It is based on a three-pronged approach: prudential requirements for
banks (Capital Requirements Directive/Regulation); prevention and management of
bank failures (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive); deposit insurance (to be
completed).
In particular, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV) imposing in ad-
dition to stricter capital requirements, introduces new Corporate Governance and
remuneration rules. Bank board characteristics are a crucial factors in bank risk-
taking (Rachdi et al., 2013), thus the qualitative and quantitative composition of
the board imposed by the new regulatory framework is aimed at preventing/curbing
excessive risk-taking. This calls for an in-depth investigation of the Corporate
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Governance composition of European banks after the introduction of the new single
rulebook, in order to fully understand if and how it fills the pre-crisis regulatory gaps.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Banks, Regulation, Single rule book, Risk
taking
2.1 Introduction
Banks exert a strong impact on economic growth (Levine, 1997; 2005;
Hagendorff et al., 2007; Bøås, 2008). Effective Corporate Governance is critical
to the proper functioning of the banking sector and the economy as a whole.
Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner
in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to economic health
(BCBS, 2015). As a result, soundness of bank Corporate Governance is a
crucial element not only for promoting a more resilient financial system (FSB,
2013) but also for sustaining economic growth (OECD, 2004; 2015).
Moreover, shortcomings in the governance of banks can result in the trans-
mission of problems across the banking system and, if widespread, can destabi-
lize the financial system (Levine, 2004; OECD, 2006; BCBS, 2015, EU, 2013).
The recent financial crisis that started in 2007 and plagued the economy until
the recent years, can be considered as "a wake-up call" and highlighted that
insufficient attention was paid to bank governance (Ahrens et al., 2011; Adams
and Mehran, 2012). Indeed, both academics and practitioners claim that short-
comings in bank governance may have played a central role in the development
of the crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Adams, 2012;
Aebi et al., 2012; Al-Sa-eed, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; EC, 2013).
These strong externalities on the economy make bank Corporate Governance
a fundamental issue. Therefore, a more comprehensive and deeper knowledge
of specific features of bank Corporate Governance is crucial in order to identify
the optimal framework to conduct an efficient risk management. As a matter
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of fact, since the crisis, risk management function has received increasing
attention due to its decisive role in risk-avoidance, that has been revealed to be
insufficient and weak. Regulation calls for Boards of Directors and Committees
that prevent the undertaking of excessive risk by financial institutions. Thus,
it is not surprising that regulators and practitioners have responded, proposing
long overdue principles of good Corporate Governance (McConnell, 2011).
Following the principles, national authorities have taken several measures
to improve regulatory and supervisory oversight of risk governance at financial
institutions, to ensure sound risk governance through changing environments
and tightening up on the roles and responsibilities of boards of directors. These
measures include the development and strengthening of existing guidance and
regulation, raising supervisory expectations for the risk management function,
engaging more frequently with the board and management, and assessing the
accuracy and usefulness of the information provided to the board to enable
effective discharge of their responsibilities (FSB, 2013).
The second pillar of Basel II identifies the role of the board as an integral
aspect of risk management, therefore aligning the internal governance struc-
ture in the light of comprehensive risk management approach seemed like an
immediate need. The European Commission pursued a number of initiatives to
create a safer and sounder financial sector for the single market and to restore
confidence in banks. This set of rules is intended to build a single rulebook
for financial intermediaries in the EU28. This framework includes prudential
requirements for banks (CRD/CRR), a better protection for depositors, and
regulates the prevention and management of bank failures (BRRD).
In particular, the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD 4) encloses stricter
rules on capital adequacy, as well as new Corporate Governance and remu-
neration rules. These latter are focused on the qualitative and quantitative
composition of Corporate Governance actors (including rules on the number
of directorships held by a director of a significant institution; new rules on risk
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and nomination committees, board diversity), risk management, financial re-
porting, the responsibilities of the board and control of executive remuneration
(including limits on the proportion of variable to fixed pay).
Finally, The European Banking Authority (EBA) has launched in October
2016 two public consultations: (i) to revise the existing Guidelines on internal
governance, published on 27 September 2011, (ii) on the assessment of the
suitability of the members of the management body and key function holders,
jointly with the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)1.
Nonetheless, national authorities need to strengthen their ability to assess
the effectiveness of a bank’s risk governance and risk culture and should engage
more frequently with the board and its risk and audit committees (FSB, 2013;
BCBS, 2015; EC, 2013).
As a result, bank board characteristics are a crucial factor of bank risk-
taking (Rachdi et al., 2013), thus the qualitative and quantitative composition
of Corporate Governance imposed by the new regulatory framework and the
effects on bank risk-taking is to be deeper analysed.
Lastly, the diversity among financial system institutions leads to different
risks faced by banks, supporting the unlikeliness to apply a single instrument
of financial stability policy (Ellis et al., 2014).
All of these issues call for a further exploration on the relation between
Corporate Governance and bank risk taking in order to fully understand how
the new Corporate Governance framework fills the pre-crisis regulatory gaps.
Both a qualitative and quantitative approach will be adopted. A first part
of the research will consist in conducting a comprehensive literature review
and a comparison of the differences between EU and US financial systems.
The quantitative approach will include descriptive statistics and an econo-
1"Generally, these guidelines are expected to contribute to the development of single rule
book and a level playing field for the EU banking and investment firm sectors and convergence
of supervisory practices and outcomes. Being a joint initiative of EBA and ESMA, these
guidelines are also expected to strengthen the consistency and reduce potential risk originating
from regulatory arbitrage within the EU financial system". ESMA (2017).
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metric model with the double purpose of identifying the best practices in bank
Corporate Governance and assessing whether the latter have already been
recognized as crucial by the new regulatory framework.
2.2 Literature
There is a wide strand of literature exploring the relationship between
Corporate Governance and bank risk-taking from different point of views.
Nonetheless, a clear and univocal consensus about the best practice is still
missing. Furthermore, the literature is mainly focused on US.
From a general perspective, Peni and Vähämaa (2012) find mixed results
in searching for an association between better governance and risk reduction.
More recently, Zagorchev and Gao (2015) show that good governance underpins
risk avoiding of financial institutions.
An extensive strand of empirical literature shows that Corporate Governance
of financial intermediaries is associated with financial and market performance
(Caprio et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2007; de Andres and Vallelado, 2008;
Hanazaki and Horiuchi, 2003; Jirapron and Chintrakarn, 2009; Laeven and
Levine, 2009; Macey and O’Hara, 2003; Mishra and Nielsen, 2000; Pacini et al.,
2005; Sierra et al., 2006; Webb Cooper, 2009; Pathan and Faff, 2013; Adams
and Mehnar, 2013). In particular, several studies observe the relation between
bank risk taking and the most relevant features of Corporate Governance:
board size, board independence, CEO duality, gender, compensation (including
CEO compensation) and risk management.
With a specific focus on board size, Pathan (2009) and Minton et al. (2010)
find that bank board size of US banks is negatively related to risk-taking
(measured as total risk, idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk) during the
pre-crisis period. This is also consistent with the study of Faleye and Krishnan
(2010), Rachdi and Ameur (2011).
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Contrariwise, Berger et al. (2012) argue that during the recent financial
crisis board size, as well as other Corporate Governance characteristics of
US commercial banks are not related to bank stability (measured in terms
of probability of default). Split views concern also independence of board
members and risk taking (Erkens et al., 2010; Yeh et al., 2011).
Literature about the relationship between bank governance and risk taking
is effectively reviewed and summarized by Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016)
as reported in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. As a matter of fact, there is a
noteworthy lack of univocal consensus about the relationship between Corporate
Governance features and bank risk-taking.
This makes further research on this topic relevant and fascinating.
Additionally, the topic is contemporary since it deals with the assessment
of a new regulatory framework of European financial intermediaries, and is to
be analysed with an on-going concern perspective.
Lastly, this research is aimed at being original, since an early literature
review conducted on these issues identifies a lack of an extensive analysis on
European Corporate Governance data.
With the aim of deeply analising the above-mentioned issues, and driven
by the existing literature, we are going to test the following hypothesis:
H0: bank risk taking is influenced by corporate governance characteristics
2.3 Methodology
2.3.1 Sample
The sample of the analysis is composed by the 30 Euro Area banks listed in
the Eurostoxx index (Table 2.1) all of which are significant entities supervised
by the European Central Bank (ECB). Six of these banks are Systemically Im-
portant Financial Institutions (SIFIs) (Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Societe Generale and Unicredit).
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Figure 2.1. Summary of prior literature on bank governance and risk taking
Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016)
Figure 2.2. Summary of prior literature on bank governance and risk taking
(cont.d)
Srivastav and Hagendorff (2016)
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The period of observation is 20082-2016. The total market capitalization (as of
July 2017) is 621 billion Euro and the Total Assets is approximately 15 billion
Euro, representing almost 70% of Total Assets of banks subject to the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) which amounted to 22 trillion euro at the end
of the comprehensive assessment exercise3 (2014). The top 5 banks in terms of
Total Assets have Total Assets of almost 8 million Euro, representing more
than a half the Total Assets of the total sample.
Considering the breakdown of sample by country, the top 5 countries in
terms of aggregate Total Assets and total market capitalization are: Spain
(that respectively has 5,113,650,635 and 258,768,458 thousand Euro – with 8
banks in the sample); France (3,434,332,000 and 95,324,674 – with 3 banks in
the sample); Italy (2,153,512,832 and 93,374,069 – with 8 banks in the sample);
Germany (2,070,996,000 and 43,010,945 – with 2 banks in the sample) and
Netherlands (1,239,563,000 and 65,035,853 – with 2 banks in the sample).
Banks in the sample are classified by business model, using the Bureau
Van Dijke variable "Bank specialization", in respect of which the sample is
composed by 24 Commercial banks, 3 Bank Holding Companies (BHC) and 1
Cooperative bank.
2.3.2 Model
We aim to study the effects of specific Corporate Governance characteristics
on bank risk taking, analysing data from Corporate Governance reports, bank
financial statements and stock market data.
Banks considered in the sample have different Corporate Governance models
2Except for ABN Amro and Bankia, which starting dates are respectively 2012 and 2011.
3European Central Bank (2014), Aggregate report on the comprehensive assessment,
26th October.
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Figure 2.3. Total Assets
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 2.4. Total Liabilities and Equity
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.5. Notes
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 2.6. Income Statement
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.7. Memo
Authors’ own elaboration
(traditional4 model, dualistic5 model and monistic6 model); the distribution of
Corporate Governance models by banks is in Table7 2.1. With respect to the
breakdown by Corporate Governance model, the most adopted model is the
monistic one (by 15 banks in the sample, representing an aggregate amount of
Total Assets of 9,077,576,901 thousand Euro and an aggregate amount of total
market capitalization 395,094,853 thousand Euro); followed by the dualistic
model (by 10 banks, with 4,656,809,646 and 179,543,662 thousand Euro) and
4In the traditional model (or horizontal two-tier model) the Shareholders’ Meeting
appoints both the Board of Directors and the Board of Statutory Auditors. The Board
of Directors has the management and the supervisory functions; the Board of Statutory
Auditors is in charge of the control function.
5In the dualistic model (or vertical two-tier model) the Shareholders’ Meeting appoints
the Supervisory Board (which has the control and the supervisory functions), that in turn
appoints the Management Board (in charge of the management function).
6With the monistic model (or one-tier model) the company is governed by one corporate
body. The Shareholders’ Meeting appoints the Board of Directors, that undertakes both
management and supervisory functions and selects among its directors the Internal Audit
Committee, which has the control function.
7Where: BNP = BNP Paribas; DBK = Deutsch Bank AG; ACA = Credit Agricole SA;
GLE = Societe Generale SA; SAN = Banco Santander SA; UCG = Unicredit SPA; INGA =
ING Groep NV; BBVA = Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA; ISP = Intesa Sanpaolo SPA;
KN = Natixis SA; CBK = Commerzbank AG; ABN = ABN Amro Group NV ; CABK =
Caixabank SA; KBC = KBC Group NV; SAB = Banco Sabadell SA; EBS = Erste Group
Bank AG; BKIA = Bankia SA; BMPS = Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena; POP = Banco
Popular Espanol SA; BIR = Bank of Ireland; BP = Banco Popolare Società Cooperativa;
UBI = Unione di Banche Italiane; RBI = Raiffeisen Bank International AG; BCP = Banco
Comercial Portugues SA; MB = Mediobanca SPA; BKN = Bankinter; EUROB = Eurobank
Ergasias SA; BPE = Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna SCARL; ALPHA = Alpha Bank
AE; PMI = Banca Popolare di Milano SCARL.
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Figure 2.8. Key ratios
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.9. Performance and Risk variables
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.10. Corporate Governance - Supervisory Directors
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.11. Corporate Governance - Supervisory Directors (cont.d)
Authors’ own elaboration
the traditional model (by 5 Italian banks, with 1,198,617,912 and 46,686,522
thousand Euro).
Even though we collected data for both Executive Board and Supervisory
Board, we run the econometric model using data referred to the board in which
the committees are estabilished, which is an information manually gathered
from each banks’ CG report. Descriptive statistics on all the collected data
are provided are provided in Figure 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11,
2.12 and 2.13.
The econometric model follows a two steps procedure:
1. Factorial analysis. Following an intensive data gathering process, we
built a large database composed by more than 200 variables on market,
financial statements and Corporate Governance data, as exposed in An-
nexes. The sources of collected data are: BVD, Boardex, Bloomberg,
banks’ financial statements and coporate governance reports. Thus, with
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Figure 2.12. Corporate Governance - Executive Directors
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.13. Corporate Governance - Executive Directors (cont.d)
Authors’ own elaboration
the purpose of synthetizing all the information, we firstly run a Factorial
Analysis, based on a Principal Component Analysis on Corporate Gover-
nance data. This process leads us to identify seven different "factors" that
explain the pattern of correlations within our set of observed variables.
2. Linear regression. Then, we run a linear regression with an "Enter"
method with the purpose of verifying the association of bank Corporate
Governance assessment and risk taking, using the seven factors identified
in step 1, among the other variables. The econometric model includes
also control variables to adjust for the state of the economy (Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU), Overall Country Risk Rating) and banks size
(natural logarithm of Total Assets).
1. Factorial analysis
(a) Explaining the procedure. The Factor Analysis has several ex-
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Table 2.1. Sample description
Bank CGmodel
BvD
Ind Country
EIU,
Country
Rating
Total Assets
th EUR
Market
cap
th EUR
BNP Monistic A+ Spain A 2,076,959,000 77,214,001
DBK Dualistic A+ Germany A 1,590,546,000 31,288,878
ACA Monistic D France A 1,524,232,000 39,518,162
GLE Monistic A+ France A 1,382,241,000 37,543,938
SAN Monistic A+ Spain BBB 1,339,125,000 85,846,241
UCG Trad. A+ Italy BB 859,532,774 35,121,432
INGA Dualistic A+ Netherlands A 845,081,000 58,589,343
BBVA Monistic A+ Spain BBB 731,856,000 48,655,568
ISP Dualistic A+ Italy BB 725,100,000 40,696,212
KN Monistic D France A 527,859,000 18,262,574
CBK Dualistic A+ Germany A 480,450,000 11,722,067
ABN Dualistic D Netherlands A 394,482,000 6,446,510
CABK Monistic B+ Spain BBB 347,927,262 24,266,695
KBC Monistic A+ Belgium A 275,200,000 28,283,590
SAB Monistic A+ Spain BBB 212,507,719 9,693,477
EBS Dualistic A+ Austria A 208,227,070 13,880,390
BKIA Monistic D Spain BBB 190,167,459 11,762,072
BMPS Trad. A+ Italy BB 153,178,466 442,158
POP Monistic A+ Spain BBB 147,925,728 1,330,404
BIR Monistic A+ Ireland BBB 123,129,000 7,217,010
BP Dualistic - Italy BB 117,411,003 1,897,228
UBI Dualistic A+ Italy BB 112,383,917 4,094,107
RBI Dualistic D Austria A 111,863,845 7,328,775
BCP Dualistic A+ Portugal BB 71.264,81 3,600,152
MB Trad. A+ Italy BB 69,818,605 7,472,029
BKN Monistic A+ Spain - 67,182,467 -
EUROB Monistic A+ Greece CCC 66,393,000 2,120,419
BPE Trad. A+ Italy BB 64,957,028 2,077,327
ALPHA Monistic A+ Greece CCC 64,872,266 3,380,702
PMI Trad. - Italy BB 51,131,039 1,573,576
Authors’ own elaboration
traction methods for constructing a solution. We chose the Principal
Components methodology for the extraction, in order to identify
uncorrelated linear combinations of variables in our analysis. This
is an iterative procedure that starts by finding a linear combination
of variables (which will be named "components" or "factors") that
explains as much variation of the original variables as possible. It
continues by finding other components that accounts for as much
of the remaining variation as possible with the constraint to be
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uncorrelated with the previous. Hence, the first factor explains max-
imum variance. The following factors explain progressively smaller
portions of the variance and are all uncorrelated with each other.
As a result, a small number of factors explain most of the variation,
and can replace the original variables. In order to minimize the
number of variables that have high loadings on each factor, we chose
an orthogonal rotation method named "Varimax". Missing values
are handled chosing to exclude case listwise.
(b) Variables selection. We select Corporate Governance variables
reported in Figure 2.3 - 2.13. Running the factorial analysis we
notice that some variables (i.e. Gender % - the portion of male
directors in the board) need to be excluded in order to maintain an
optimal level of statistic significance. Finally, the selected variables
result in the ones reported in Table8 2.2, with a P-Person correlation
reported in Figure 2.14.
(c) Running the analysis. Firstly, we run two tests to detect the suit-
ability of data for factorial analysis (Table 2.3): the Kaiser-Meyer-
Olkin (KMO) Measure of Sampling Adequacy and the Barlett’s Test.
The first one indicates the proportion of variance among variables
in database that might be caused by underlying factors. It’s value
is comprised between 0 and 1, and generally values higher than 0.5
indicate that factor analysis may be useful in summarizing original
data. Bartlett’s test of sphericity is used to test the hypothesis
that the correlation matrix is an identity one. In fact, in this case,
variables are unrelated and unsuitable for factorial analysis. Values
of the significance level smaller than 0.05 indicate the usefulness of
factorial analysis.
Then, we calculate the Total Variance explained by our model
8Where in the "Source" column CG stands for Corporate Governance Annual reports.
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Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std
Dev
N Description Source
YBoard 5.32 2.61 161 Time on Board for the individual at a selected Annual Report
Date
Boardex
NQuoted 3.41 1.64 161 Number of Quoted Boards Boardex
AVGY
Quoted
3.38 1.61 161 The Average Time that a Director sits on the Board of Quoted
Companies
Boardex
Age 60.31 3.74 161 Current age of selected individual Boardex
Edu 1.74 0.59 161 The number of Qualification earned of selected individual Boardex
Nationality 0.24 0.21 161 Portion of Directors from different countries at the Annual
Report Date selected
Boardex
STDRole 3.46 2.20 161 Standard deviation of time on Board values for all the Direc-
tors
Boardex
Ind% 59.68 28.01 161 Portion of Indipendent Directors at the Annual Report Date
selected
CG
Audit% 0.31 0.11 161 Portion of Directors of the Audit Committee related to Board
Size
CG
AuditMeet 13.41 11.62 161 The number of meetings of the Audit Committee during the
year
CG
Rem% 0.27 0.10 161 Portion of Directors of the Remuneration Committee related
to Board Size
CG
RemMeet 8.04 4.70 161 The number of meetings of the Remuneration Committee dur-
ing the year
CG
Nom% 0.29 0.10 161 Portion of Directors of the Nomination Committee related to
Board Size
CG
NomMeet 6.77 4.55 161 The number of meetings of the Nomination Committee during
the year
CG
Ln(Size) 2.82 0.28 161 The natural logarithm of the number of Directors seating on
the Board
CG
BoardMeet 13.99 6.57 161 The number of Board meetings during the year CG
AuditInd% 80.44 22.55 161 Portion of Independent Directors on the Audit Committee CG
NomInd% 71.94 26.38 161 Portion of Independent Directors on the Nomination Commit-
tee
CG
RemInd% 79.73 20.15 161 Portion of Independent Directors on the Remuneration Com-
mittee
CG
CG Com-
mittee
0.47 0.50 161 Does the company have a Corporate Governance committee? Boardex
CGSscore 63.45 23.99 161 The CG pillar measures a company’s systems and processes,
which ensure that its board members and executives act in the
best interests of its long term shareholders. It reflects a com-
pany’s capacity, through its use of best management practices,
to direct and control its rights and responsibilities through the
creation of incentives, as well as checks and balances in order
to generate long term shareholder value
Datastream
EW Rat-
ing
73.67 28.04 161 The Equal Weighted Rating reflects a balanced view of a com-
pany’s performance in all four areas, economic, environmental,
social and Corporate Governance
Datastream
STDAge 8.33 2.36 161 Standard deviation of the population of the ages of Directors
for all the Directors
Boardex
Authors’ own elaboration
(Figure 2.15) that is the amount of variance in the original variables
accounted for by each factor. The % of Variance column shows the
percentage of the variance accounted for by each factor to the total
variance in all of the variables. The Cumulative % column shows
the portion of variance accounted for by our seven extracted factors.
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As shown in Figure 2.15, the first factor explains the largest portion
of variance in the original variables, and the total variance explained
by our model is almost 75% of variance in the original variables,
which is a good result and lead us to reduce the complexity of the
data set by using these seven factors, with less than 25% loss of
information. In order to compute the portion of variance explained
by each variable grouped in factors, we show the initial and the
extracted values of communalities (Table 2.4). Each variable show
a value of extraction communality higher than 0.5, which generally
is the level of tolerance for significant results in the analysis.
Table 2.3. KMO and Bartlett’s Test
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy 0.652
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 2.123,34
df 253.000
Sig. 0.000
Authors’ own elaboration
(d) We choose to synthetize original variables in seven factors, helped
by the scree plot, that shows the eigenvalue of each component in
the initial solution. The optimal number of factors to be extracted
is the one with the eigenvalue higher than 1. We can notice a
distinct break (that is in line with eigenvalus higher than 1) between
the steep slope of the large factors and the gradual trailing of the
rest (Figure 2.18). Figure 2.18 shows a steep downward slope for
the first seven components. Once we identify the optimal number
of factors, we use the Component Matrix (Figure 2.16) and the
Rotated Component Matrix (Figure 2.17) to understand which are
the original variables represented by each factor.
The latter shows the following composition of the seven factors:
• Factor 1: AuditInd%; RemInd%; Ind%; NomInd% (hence, this
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Figure 2.14. Correlation matrix
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 2.15. Total Variance explained
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.16. Component Matrix
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.17. Rotated Component Matrix
Authors’ own elaboration
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Table 2.4. Communalities
Variable Initial Extraction
YBoard 1.000 0.753
NQuoted 1.000 0.785
AVGYQuoted 1.000 0.631
Age 1.000 0.666
Edu 1.000 0.740
Nationality 1.000 0.705
STDRole 1.000 0.775
Ind% 1.000 0.787
Audit% 1.000 0.773
AuditMeet 1.000 0.815
Rem% 1.000 0.731
RemMeet 1.000 0.724
Nom% 1.000 0.643
NomMeet 1.000 0.792
Ln(Size) 1.000 0.619
BoardMeet 1.000 0.730
AuditInd% 1.000 0.778
NomInd% 1.000 0.788
RemInd% 1.000 0.735
CGCommittee 1.000 0.811
CGSscore 1.000 0.896
EWRating 1.000 0.857
STDAge 1.000 0.637
Authors’ own elaboration
is labeled as "Independence factor").
• Factor 2: Audit%; Rem%; ln(Size); Nom% ("Size factor").
• Factor 3: NomMeet; BoardMeet; RemMeet; AuditMeet ("Meet-
ing factor").
• Factor 4: YBoard; STDRole; Age ("Time factor").
• Factor 5: CGScore; EWRating; CGCommittee ("Corporate
Governance quality factor").
• Factor 6: Nationality; NQuoted ("Natural Experience factor").
• Factor 7: Edu; AVGYQuoted; STDAge ("Achieved Experience
factor").
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Figure 2.18. Scree Plot
Authors’ own elaboration
2. Linear regression. It is used to model the value of a dependent
scale variable based on its linear relationship to one or more predictors.
We want to verify the relationship between bank risk and Corporate
Governance. To do so, we use three different models to run the linear
regression, choosing the "Enter" method. We separate the variables in
three different blocks: the first containing accounting and market data;
the second containing Corporate Governance data, that will be added
in the first model; the last containing only Corporate Governance data.
In Corporate Governance data we use the seven factors identified in
step (1.). Missing values (about 3.5% of the dataset) of each variable
are replaced with the average value of the bank for the entire period of
observation. Bank risk is measured by the proxy Z − Score, following
the previous literature (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Pathan, 2009;
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Hadad et al., 2011; Cubillas et al.,
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2012; García-Sánchez et al., 2017). Z − Score refers to the degree of
solvency (thus, equity is not sufficient to cover losses) of the company.
More specifically, it represents the number of standard deviations that
Return on Assets (ROA) has to drop before equity is depleted (Laeven
and Levine, 2009; García-Sánchez et al., 2017). Considering that ROA
is the ratio between Net Income and Total Assets, and naming Capital
Ratio (CAR) the ratio between Equity and Total Assets, we can assume
that the probability of insolvency can be explained as the probability of
CAR < ROA (García-Sánchez et al., 2017). Hence, Z − Score can be
computed by the ratio between the sum of ROA and CAR and standard
deviation of ROA:
Z − Score = ROAit + CARit
SDROAi
(2.1)
where is ROAit of bank i in year t; is CARit of bank i in year t; and
SDROAi is the standard deviation of ROA for each bank, calculated
over the period of observation (from 2006 to 2016). In this way, Z−Score
represents the inverse of the probability of insolvency (García-Sánchez
et al., 2017). Thus, higher values of Z − Score represent higher level
of solvency, and viceversa. To reduce the skewness of this operator, we
use its natural logarithm in the analysis. The description of the other
variables considered in the analysis, as well as their descriptive statistics,
is reported in Table 2.5.
More specifically, we expect the following signs for the relationship
between variables:
• Positive relationship:
– Loan Loss Res/NPLs, TCR, CAR, Equity/Liabilities: since a
high ratio of these ratios may be good in preventing bank risk;
118
2. Better safe than sorry
Will the single rulebook on bank CG prevent excessive risk taking?
– Rating: since a good country rating should be associated with
good functioning of banks operating in that country;
– ExternalC, SuccessionPlan, SayPay, GoldenP: since they are
assumed to be best practices in Corporate Governance;
• Negative relationship:
– CostIncome, Ln(NPLs), Ln(Intangibles), Derivatives/TA, NPLs/TA,
Subordinated/TA: since they should be associated with a high
level of risk in banks financial statements
• Undetermined relationship:
– NIM, Ln(TA), Net Loans/TA, Ownership: since high values of
these variables may be associated with high value of risk
– CGFactor1, CGFactor2, CGFactor3, CGFactor4, CGFactor5,
CGFactor6, CGFactor7, Duality, Executives, Re-electionY, Gen-
der, STDQuoted, STDEdu: since, as the review of literature
outlined, there is no an univocal consensus about which is the
relationship between Corporate Governance characteristics and
banks risk taking.
Since they represent structural information, Corporate Governance vari-
ables, do not show so much variation over time; moreover, changements
in these values usually occur when the Board of Directors is re-appointed.
Most of the banks in the sample have a smallest interval of years in which
the board members are subject to re-election equal to 3.
Thus, we choose to consider all the Corporate Governance variables
(CGFactors as computed with Factorial Analysis included) lagged by 3
years in the regression model. This is also rational if we consider that
the effects of Corporate Governance characteristics may not be evaluated
in the Annual Report date selected. Finally, this can also be favorable
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to avoid endogeneity biases (Cornett et al., 2007).
The three tested models are:
Z − Scorei = β0 +
16∑
n=1
βnXni + ui (2.2)
Z−Scorei = β0+
16∑
n=1
βnXni+
7∑
s=1
βsCGFactorsi+
33∑
n=24
βnXni+ui (2.3)
Z − Scorei = β0 +
7∑
s=1
βsCGFactorsi +
33∑
n=24
βnXni + ui (2.4)
In model 2.2 we look for a relationship between bank risk and both
accounting and market data; in model 2.3 we include also Corporate
Governance data; in model 2.4 we consider only Coporate Governance
data.
2.4 Results
Figure 2.19 and 2.20 show respectively the summary extended exposition
of results of the regression models.
The signs of the relations between variables are highly stable over the
three model, meaning a good accuracy of the estimation. In particular, as
we expected: Loan Loss Res/NPLs; TCR; CAR and Equity/Liabilities are
positively correlated with the proxy of Z-Score, thus a high ratio of these
variables may be good in preventing bank risk. The relationships are
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Table 2.5. Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. N Description Source
Ln(ZSCORE) 0.32 2.03 176 The natural logarithm of Z-Score
LoanLossRes/NPLs 56.32 13.98 176 The ratio betweem Loan loss Reserves and NPLs BVD
TCR 14.50 2.36 176 The Total Capital Ratio = (Tier 1 + Tier 2)/Risk
Weighted Assets (RWA)
BVD
CAR 6.23 2.34 176 Capital Ratio = Equity/Total Assets BVD
Equity/
Liabilities 6.78 2.68 176 The ratio between Equity and Liabilities BVD
NIM 1.67 0.66 176 Net Interest Margin = (Interest Revenues – Interest Ex-
penses)/Total Earning Assets
BVD
CostIncome 64.52 12.44 176 The ratio between operating costs and Net Income BVD
Net Loans/TA 54.99 16.21 176 The ratio between Net Loans and Total Assets BVD
Ln(TA) 19.43 1.14 176 The natural logarithm of Total Assets
Ln(NPLs) 15.79 0.90 176 The natural logarithm of NPLs
Ln(Intangibles) 14.30 1.57 176 The natural logarithm of Intangibles
Derivatives/TA 0.07 0.08 176 The ratio between Derivatives Assets and Total Assets
NPLs/TA 0.04 0.04 176 The ratio between NPLs and Total Assets
Subordinated/TA 0.02 0.01 176 The ratio between Subordinated and Total Assets
Rating 11.56 3.37 176 Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). Overall Country Risk
Rating
BVD
Ownership 12.74 6.06 176 BVD Independence indicator - each company’s degree of
independence to its shareholders
BVD
CGFactor1 -0.01 0.90 176 "Independence factor" as computed in the analysis
CGFactor2 -0.06 0.85 176 "Size factor" as computed
CGFactor3 0.00 0.91 176 "Meeting factor" as computed
CGFactor4 0.01 0.91 176 "Time factor" as computed
CGFactor5 0.00 0.89 176 "Corporate Governance quality factor" as computed
CGFactor6 0.00 0.86 176 "Natural experience factor" as computed
CGFactor7 0.02 0.91 176 "Achieved experience factor" as computed
Duality 0.06 0.24 176 Banks in which the CEO also holds the position of the
Chairman of the Board
CG
Executives 15.01 14.25 176 Portion of Executive Directors at the Annual Report Date
selected
CG
Re-electionY 3.85 1.17 176 The smallest interval of years in which the board members
are subject to re-election
CG
ExternalC 0.62 0.48 176 Does the board or board committees have the authority
to hire external advisers or consultants?
CG
SuccessionPlan 0.55 0.49 176 Does the company have a succession plan for Executives
in the event of unforeseen circumstances?
CG
SayPay 0.34 0.47 176 Does the company have Say on Pay? CG
GoldenP 0.26 0.43 176 Does the company have Golden Parachutes? CG
Gender 84.94 11.66 176 Portion of male Directors at the Annual Report Date se-
lected
Boardex
STDQuoted 2.61 1.50 176 Standard Deviation of Quoted Boards that have been sat
on overtime for all the Directors
Boardex
STDEdu 1.10 0.33 176 Standard deviation of the population of the number of
Qualifications for all the Directors
Boardex
Authors’ own elaboration
also very significant, respectively at 5%; 5% and 1% level of significance
(in model 2.2, and always at 10% in model 2.3).
We also find negative and very significant relationship with CostIncome;
Ln(NPLs); Ln(Intangibles); Derivatives/TA; NPLs/TA and Subordi-
nated/TA, meaning that these variables should be associated with a high
level of risk in banks financial statements. Hence, we can notice that
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accounting based data confirm our initial hypotheses (the only exception
being rating and ownership variables). Even though, results on Corporate
Governance are significant in model 2.3 and 2.4, they seem to be not so
very stable in the two models, meaning that CG variables can not be
considered as the only explanatory variable of the risk (of performance)
of a bank, as we already expected.
Nonetheless, in model 2.3 our results are strongly consistent with agency
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Yermack, 1996;
Eisenberg et al., 1998). The agency relationship is the engagement of
an agent (manager) to preserve and safeguard principal (shareholder)’s
interests on its behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Conventional wisdom
recognises that independence, diversity and expertise enhance corporate
governance quality and safeguard shareholders’ interests. Fama and
Jensen (1983a; 1983b) and Beasley (1996) identify independence as a
vital characteristic of directors to mitigate agency conflicts between
management and shareholders because their role in the board permit
them to perform a better critical monitoring function. Results of the
analysis show that there is a positive and highly significant (at 1%
level of significance) relationship between independence of directors -
"CGFactor1" - and the solvency of the bank. This is also consistent
with the result obtained on the "Executives" variable (negatively related
and significant at 5% level of significance). Moreover, consistently with
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) CEO duality may reduce the
ability of the board in preserving shareholders’ interests. Indeed, CEO
may not separate personal interest from shareholders’ interests and the
control function of the board may be less effective (Jensen, 1993; Lasfer,
2006). We also find that CEO duality may be related to excessive bank
risk, since result show a negative and significant relationship at a 10%
level of significance.
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ExternalC; SuccessionPlan; SayPay; GoldenP - that are assumed to be
best practices in Corporate Governance - as well as Re-electionY; Gender;
STDQuoted are not very significant.
That is, Corporate Governance is not important itself, but to the extent
in which it prevents excessive bank risk taking and improves performance,
dealing with an adequate structure of banks financial statement.
2.4.1 Robustness checks
In Figure 2.19 the Durbin-Watson test confirms that the model can be
applied because its value is comprised between 1.5 and 2.5 (1.888). The
statistics R2 and AdjustedR2 show a very good fit of the models 2.2 and
2.3 to the variables (respectively 0.609 and 0.572 for the first model and
0.759 and 0.703 for the second model). Contrariwise, the same statistics
are poor for model 2.4, being 0.505 and 0.255. The statistics FChange
are highly significant (at a 0.1%, with a value of 0.000) for the three
models. The ANOVA table (Figure 2.21) reports significant F statistics
for the three models, indicating that using the models is better than
guessing the mean of the dependent variable (Z − Score). To sum up,
we obtain results with a good level of significance, but different biases
occur when considering Corporate Governance data in the developing
of the analysis, which is commonly known in the Corporate Governance
literature. Nevertheless, this is an additional proof that Corporate
Governance is not sufficient itself.
Figure 2.23 show the collinearity statistics, computed in order to evaluate
potential biases int the model: Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF). The first is the portion of the variance in a given predictor that
cannot be explained by the other variables. When tolerance values are
close to 0, there is high multicollinearity and the standard error of the
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Figure 2.19. Results
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.20. Summary of the models
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 2.21. Anova
Authors’ own elaboration
regression coefficients may be inflated. As concerns the variance inflation
factors, a value greater than 10 is usually considered problematic, since
this statistic quantifies the level of multicollinearity and represents the
portion of variance of an estimated regression coefficient that is increased
because of collinearity. VIF values are well below 10 in Model 2.2 and
Model 2.4, but the statics reveal a collinearity bias in model 2.3. Another
way of checking whether the regression model has achieved its goal to
explain as much variation as possible in the dependent variable while
respecting the underlying assumption, is to check the residuals and the
unexplained variation. Figure 2.24, 2.25 and 2.26 show respictevely resid-
ual statistics and plots that help us to verify that residuals are normally
distribuited, as they should be to determine whether the regression model
is well structured with a mean of -1.32E-14 and a standard deviation of
0.901.
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Figure 2.22. Coefficients
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Figure 2.23. Coefficients (cont.d)
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 2.24. Statistics of residuals
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 2.25. Histogram of the residuals
Authors’ own elaboration
2.5 Conclusion
Rules come when failures occur.
Banks’ safety and soundness are key to financial stability, and the manner
in which they conduct their business, therefore, is central to economic health
(BCBS, 2015). As a result, soundness of bank Corporate Governance is a
crucial element not only for promoting a more resilient financial system (FSB,
2013) but also for sustaining economic growth (OECD, 2004; 2015).
Moreover, shortcomings in the governance of banks can result in the trans-
mission of problems across the banking system and, if widespread, can destabi-
lize the financial system (Levine, 2004; OECD, 2006; BCBS, 2015, EU, 2013).
The recent financial crisis that started in 2007 and plagued the economy until
the recent years, can be considered as "a wake-up call" and highlighted that
insufficient attention was paid to bank governance (Ahrens et al., 2011; Adams
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Figure 2.26. Normal P-P Plot of regression standardized residuals
Authors’ own elaboration
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and Mehran, 2012). Indeed, both academics and practitioners claim that short-
comings in bank governance may have played a central role in the development
of the crisis (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Aguilera and Jackson, 2010; Adams, 2012;
Aebi et al., 2012; Al-Sa-eed, 2012; Erkens et al., 2012; EC, 2013). The current
Regulation calls for Boards of Directors and Committees that prevent the
undertaking of excessive risk by financial institutions.
As a matter of fact, Regulation may impact on financial risk taking by
financial intermediaries by way of the decision-making process envisaged in
the various possible legal structures set forth by the law (Brogi, 2009).
The literature review conducted shows that even though policy makers
attribute increasing importance to Corporate Governance, and there is a
growing set of rules that are going to be implemented in the next years, there
seems to be mixed evidence on the relation between board size and composition
and performance in empirical analysis.
We would expect that our results lead us to assess whether or not Corporate
Governance needs to be deeply regulated and which are the most relevant
Corporate Governance characteristics that may have impact on bank risk.
Actually, it seems that Corporate Governance characteristics exert impact on
bank risking but governance structures differ systematically across countries.
The well-known rule that there is not a "one size fits all model", should teach
that banks Corporate Governance regulations must be taylor-made, toward
creating sound incentives for banks stakeholders. Nonetheless, Corporate
Governance is not important itself, but to the extent in which it prevents
excessive bank risk taking and improves performance.
Moreover, running after the harmonization of national regulations across
economies with very different governance structures may have restrictive effect
on the scope of the business judgment rule.
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Chapter 3
Are banks finding their feet?
Cluster analysis of banks’ business models
Abstract: Business Model Assessment (BMA) is on the top of the agenda of
regulators. The aim of this paper is to examine the relationship between banks’
business models and both viability and sustainability, as intended by the European
Banking Authority (EBA) in 2014. Business models are identified with a cluster
analysis based on assets and funding structure of banks’ balance sheet as well as
the income diversification. The sample of analysis is composed by the 30 Euro area
banks listed on the Eurostoxx banks index. Policy implications are also commented.
JEL classification: G21, G32, L11 Keywords: banks, business model, cluster
analysis, profitability, risk
3.1 Introduction
"Looking at the priorities for the year ahead of us, I think it is safe to say
that the economic environment in which banks operate will remain challenging.
In particular, the economic climate in the euro area poses challenges to banks’
profitability and many of them will have to review their business models in
order to tackle this challenge. Business models in terms of their viability and
profit drivers will remain a priority for us in 2016." (Nouy, 2015).
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Economic recovery requires a strong and resilient banking system (BIS,
2013). European banking supervisors are addressing this issue by promot-
ing frameworks to review and evaluate European banks, which include the
assessment of the viability and sustainability of their business models (EBA,
20141; Nouy, 2015). Indeed, academic research has shown that different banks
business models may expose banks to different risks (Cavelaars and Passenier,
2012; Kohler, 2015) and higher profitability may favour a sounder capital
structure through retained earnings (Berger, 1995; Thakor, 2014).
Business Model Assessment (BMA) is on the top of the agenda of regulators.
In particular, it is one of the four core areas of banking supervision (along with
governance and controls, capital, and liquidity) as defined in the Guidelines
on common procedures and methodologies for the Supervisory Review and
Evaluation Process (SREP) issued by EBA in 2014. The latter Guidelines
suggest that competent authorities should conduct regular business model
analysis (BMA) to assess business and strategic risks and determine:
• Viability (Ability to generate acceptable returns over the following 12
months) that is in turn related to the analysis of
– Capital - Comparison of return on equity (ROE) against the cost
of equity (COE); additional metrics such as return on assets or
risk-adjusted return on capital may be considered;
– Funding - Appropriateness of funding mix for business model and
strategy;
– Risk appetite - Both for individual and aggregate risks, its consis-
tency with the stated strategy, and its capacity to manage within its
risk appetite. Supervisors will take a view on what is an appropriate
risk appetite for each bank, as well as for the system as a whole.
1EBA (2014), Guidelines on SREP methodologies and processes, 19th December.
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• Sustainability (Ability to generate acceptable returns over a forward-
looking period of at least three years):
– Riskiness of the strategy, especially the ambition and complexity
of the strategy set against the current business model, and the
likelihood of successful delivery of the strategy based on assessment
of the board and senior management team’s ability to execute it.
This paper focuses inter alia on viability, with the aim of examining the
relationship between banks’ business model and both profitability and risk.
The assumption of this paper is that bank business models can provide a
telling clue to future profitability opportunities and risks.
In assessing bank business models and profitability, two main questions
must be answered: (i) what drives profitability (in a low or negative interest
rate environment such as the current one)? (ii) are those profits sustainable?
This paper aims to contribute to the recent debate on bank business models
by slicing and dicing the profitability drivers of a sample of over 150 European
banks, for a ten-year period, starting from the 30 banks which make up
the Eurostoxx index. This enables us to use the market valuation of bank
performance.
3.2 Institutional background
In its priorities for 2016 the ECB’s Supervisory Board announced that it
would conduct a Business Model Analysis (BMA): The key risk that stands out
relates to banks’ business models and profitability. Both are being challenged
by the high level of asset impairments and the protracted period of low interest
rates. In 2016, building on previous work around banks’ business models and
on profitability analyses, the SSM is launching a thematic review of banks’
profitability drivers at firm level and across business models. The analysis of
profitability drivers will facilitate the identification of banks with structurally
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low profitability. In this context, an area of supervisory focus will be examining
whether profitability is achieved through, among other things, a weakening of
credit standards, greater reliance on short-term funding, or an increase in risk
exposures not commensurate with the bank’s stated risk appetite2. The way
in which the BMA will be performed has not been disclosed in detail. Each
Joint Supervisory Team has provided explanations to supervised banks, but
there is no official detailed description of how the BMA will be conducted.
Moreover, the Chair, the Deputy Chair and other members of the ECB’s
Supervisory Board have commented the bank business models and BMA in
their official speeches (Figure 3.1 and 3.2) and based on their statements it
seems that the business model classification tool which will be used to conduct
the peer group analysis will be based on the more than 80 aspects collected in
the SREP assessment and that peer groups will be identified on the basis of
business models, size and geography.
3.3 Literature
Academic literature on banks’ business model is wide and constantly in-
creasing. Cavelaars and Passenier (2012) surveyed the literature on this topic
until 2011. Then, the most relevant paper that examine the relationship be-
tween banks’ business models and performance or risk are: Ayadi et al. (2011);
Beltratti and Stulz (2012); Roengpitya et al. (2014); Kohler (2015); Gabbi
and Sironi (2015); Mergaerts and Vennet (2016); Petrella and Resti (2016).
There are several definitions of business models reviewed by Cavelaars and
Passenier, 20123. We are particularly interested in empirical literature that
2ECB Banking Supervision: SSM priorities 2016, 6 January 2016.
3Cavelaars and Passenier (2012) report the following definition: "We define a business
model as consisting of two elements: (a) what the business does and (b) how the business
makes money doing those things (Weill et al., 2004). A good business model answers Peter
Drucker’s age-old questions: who is the customer? And what does the customer value? It
also answers the fundamental questions every manager must ask: How do we make money in
this business? What is the underlying economic logic that explains how we can deliver value
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Figure 3.1. Bank business models and BMA in the speeches of the members of
the ECB’s Supervisory Board and other top ECB officials
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 3.2. Bank business models and BMA in the speeches of the members of
the ECB’s Supervisory Board and other top ECB officials (cont.d)
Authors’ own elaboration
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proposes a classification of banks based on their business models and links
the latter to performance (risk or return). Different banks business models
may expose banks to different risks (Cavelaars and Passenier, 2012; Kohler,
2015) and higher profitability may favour a sounder capital structure through
retained earnings (Berger, 1995; Thakor, 2014).
There are many ways of identifying business models, all are to some extent
arbitrary, one possibility is to break down the sample in universal banks,
commercial banks and investment banks based on balance sheet figures as
proposed by Ötker-Robe, p.25 et al. (2011) – i.e. or using a mixture of
statement of income and balance sheet aggregates as Kohler, 2015. According
to the former approach, banks are classified as investment banks if loans are
less than 15% of total assets or securities are more than 60% of total assets,
and as commercial banks if loans are more than 60% of total assets or securities
are less than 15% of total assets and then, after these criteria are applied, all
other banks are classified based on judgment, taking into account the scope of
derivatives activities, the relative shares of securities and loans, and the share
of trading income in total revenue. Kohler’s study includes cooperative banks,
savings banks, commercial banks, bank holding companies and investment
banks, investment corporations and securities houses in 15 EU countries and
finds that banks’ business models differ in terms of their business objective
(based on the share of non-interest income in total operating income and the
share of non-deposit funding in total liabilities) and ownership structure.
Furthermore, Roengpitya et al. (2014) identify three business models (retail-
funded commercial banks, wholesale-funded commercial banks and capital
markets-oriented bank) by applying a clustering algorithm that uses eight
selected balance sheet ratios4. In particular, they find that the first two models
to customers at an appropriate cost? (Margretta, 2002). The business model is a structural
template that describes the organization of a focal firm’s transactions with all of its external
constituents in factor and product markets (Zott and Amit, 2008)."
4"The asset side ratios relate to: (i) total loans; (ii) securities (measured as the sum of
trading assets and liabilities net of derivatives); (iii) the size of the trading book (measured as
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differ mainly in terms of banks’ funding structure, while the other stands out
primarily because of banks’ greater engagement in trading activities. Acharya
et al. (2010), Altunbas et al. (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz, (2012) show that
a higher leverage ratio and the reliance on short-term capital market funding
amplify adverse effects on banks during the subprime crisis. Demirguc-Kunt
and Huizinga (2010) similarly report the wholesale funding lowers the rate of
return on assets and the enhancing in bank fragility is a particular concern
for banks which attract most of their short-term funding in the form of non-
deposits. Several authors (Brogi, 2011; Petrella and Resti, 2012; Mergaerts and
Vennet, 2015; Calomiris, 2013; Dombret, 2014; Gabbi and Sironi, 2015) express
concerns on the impact of the new regulatory framework, and especially on
structural regulations, on bank business models. Petrella and Resti (2012)
assess that the new liquidity rules set in Basel 3 are expected to prompt a major
shift in the business models of banks, tilting their asset mix towards low-risk,
low-return assets and possibly constraining their ability to support growth
through an adequate credit supply. Gabbi and Sironi (2015) based on an
analysis of the different proposals conclude that "Since the regulatory reaction
to the crisis was a reinforcement of the prudential model along with structural
solutions, we conclude that such a mixed model could fail the purpose to resolve
the trade-off between safety and efficiency". More specifically, structural reforms
could have the following drawbacks:
• commercial banking is not necessarily safer than investment banking,
Dombret (2014) "the question of stability ultimately depends on the
sustainability of the business model. And a commercial bank that is highly
the sum of trading securities at fair value through income book); and (iv) interbank lending
(measured as the sum of loans and advances to banks, reverse repos and cash collateral). The
liability side ratios relate to: (i) customer deposits; (ii) wholesale debt (measured as the sum
of other deposits, short-term borrowing and long-term funding); (iii) stable funding (measured
as the sum of total customer deposits and long-term funding); and (iv) interbank borrowing
(measured as deposits from banks plus repos and cash collateral)." Roengpitya, Rungporn,
Nikola A. Tarashev, and Kostas Tsatsaronis. "Bank business models." BIS Quarterly Review
December (2014).
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leveraged and has an unsustainable business model can be as risky as any
investment bank. In addition, breaking up the banks would reduce their
potential to diversify";
• even though breaking up the banks could reduce the investment bank
risk attitude, not only large deposit banks would be protected but also
medium-sized institutions could possibly be bailed out by risk-averse
regulators (Calomiris, 2013);
• "though there is a growing consensus on the need and the advantages of
separation in theory it is not so clear how to strike the right balance in
the separation of commercial banking from other activities in practice.
This appears to be the next challenge facing policy-makers, academia and
practitioners" (Brogi, 2011).
Mergaerts and Vennet (2015) investigate a sample of 500 European banks
in 1998-2013 and conclude that reforms in banking regulations lead to a
further reconsideration of banks’ business models, thus the assessment of
these initiatives requires a deeper understanding of the performance outcomes
associated with different bank business models. The authors identify two
different business models: retail and diversification banks using a factor analysis
model and studying the impact of business models on bank performance as
measured by Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA), Net Interest
Margin (NIM) and Z-score. The closest work to this paper is Roengpitya et
al. (2014) that propose a cluster analysis and identify three business models:
retail-funded commercial banks and wholesale-funded commercial banks –
that mainly differ in terms of banks’ funding structure – and capital markets-
oriented bank – that stands out primarily because of banks’ greater engagement
in trading activities.
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3.4 Methodology
The sample of analysis is composed by the 30 Euro area banks listed on the
Eurostoxx banks index. We propose a two-steps methodology. First, a cluster
analysis allows a to identify banks business models. The analysis is based on
assets and funding structure of banks’ balance sheet as well as the income
diversification. Then, we "slice and dice" banks financial statements data
throught descriptive statistics to examine the relationship between different
banks’ business models and both profitability and risk.
3.5 Data
The sample is composed by 30 Euro Area banks which make up the
Eurostoxx index (Table 3.1) all of which are significant entities supervised
by the European Central Bank (ECB)5. The index is subject to periodic
rebalancing and its current structure was introduced on 20 June 2016 with
entry of Alpha Bank, the re-entry after a number of years of ABN AMRO, the
deletion of Banca Popolare di Sondrio and the substitution of National Bank
of Greece with Eurobank Ergasias.
Total assets of banks in the sample is equal to 14,86 trillion euro, represent-
ing almost 70% of total assets of banks subject to the SSM which amounted to
22 trillion euro at the end of the comprehensive assessment6. Notwithstanding
the fact that it is made up of the largest listed euro area banks, the sample is
very heterogeneous in terms of size. Average total assets at the end of 2015
amounted to 501 billion euro with a standard deviation exceeding 112%. The
top 5 banks have total assets exceeding those of the remaining 25.
5As of the list provided on 30th September 2015 which includes 120 credit institutions.
6European Central Bank (2014), Aggregate report on the comprehensive assessment, 26th
October. "Note that the following banks did not participate in the comprehensive assessment
but will be directly supervised by the ECB as significant institutions: Banco de Credito Social
Cooperativo, Banesco Holding Hispania, Banque Degroof S.A., Barclays Bank PLC (Italy),
Novo Banco SA, Sberbank Europe AG, Unicredit Banka Slovenija d.d. and VTB Bank AG
(Austria)."
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Table 3.1. Components of the Eurostoxx Bank Index
Name Country Market Cap31.12.2015
Total Assets
31.12.2015
BNP Paribas FR 65,088,295 1,994,193,000
Deutsche Bank DE 31,157,777 1,629,130,000
Crédit Agricole FR 28,715,878 1,529,294,000
Banco Santander ES 65,821,288 1,340,260,000
Société Générale FR 34,320,317 1,334,391,000
UniCredit IT 30,671,295 860,433,400
ING NL 48,178,363 841,769,000
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria ES 42,911,423 750,078,000
Intesa Sanpaolo IT 49,006,090 676,496,000
Commerzbank DE 12,022,637 532,641,000
Natixis FR 16,328,828 500,257,000
ABN AMRO NL 4,468,854 390,317,000
Caixabank ES 18,695,008 344,255,500
KBC Groep BE 24,093,430 252,356,000
Banco de Sabadell ES 8,920,362 208,627,800
Bankia ES 12,323,542 206,969,600
Erste Group Bank AT 12,425,518 199,743,400
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena IT 3,606,458 169,012,000
Banco Popular Espanol ES 6,581,828 158,649,900
Bank of Ireland IE 11,003,514 130,960,000
Banco Popolare IT 4,639,526 120,509,600
Unione di Banche Italiane IT 5,590,844 117,200,800
Raiffeisen Bank International AT 3,987,444 114,426,600
Banco Comercial Português PT 2,951,951 74,884,900
Eurobank Ergasias GR 2,273,439 73,553,000
Mediobanca IT 7,631,078 70,710,600
Alpha Bank GR 3,826,834 69,296,200
Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna IT 3,388,408 61,261,200
Bankinter ES 5,878,584 58,659,800
Banca Popolare di Milano IT 4,040,441 50,203,300
Total 570,549,253 14,860,539,600
Authors’ own elaboration on Eurostoxx,
Bloomberg and Bankscope data
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Breakdown of sample banks by country (Table 3.2) shows that, in terms
of total assets at the end of 2015, French banks make up over a third of the
sample, followed by Spanish banks, almost a fifth, and Italian and German
banks which represent over 14% of total assets. Average size of banks in the
sample varies greatly: French and German banks are much larger than Spanish
and Italian banks (average total assets respectively of 1,382 billion euro, 1,090
billion euro, 438 billion euro and 266 billion euro).
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Financial data are gathered from Bankscope (Bureau Van Dijk) and include
balance sheet, income statement and notes to the financial statements data.
While some data are available from 2000 onwards, the period of observation
is from 2006-2015 in order to ensure better coverage and consistency of the
analysis.
In Table 3.4 we provide a list of selected variables in our data set, with
their definition and descriptive statistics. The difference between the average
and the median values and the percentage standard deviation show that the
sample is heterogeneous in terms of size whilst, as commented in the sections
below much more homogeneous in terms of asset mix and profitability drivers.
Looking at Table 3.4 we can notice that:
• Total Assets: more than half (18) of all the banks in the sample decreased
total assets during the period of observation. Almost all of them (except
Natixis, that starts from 2006) decreased total assets in the second
sub-period (2010-2015). The critical year is 2013, in which almost all
the banks decrease total assets (except Alpha bank, BPER, Sabadell,
National Bank of Greece) by more than 7.5% on average with a peek of
20.32% of Deutsche Bank. Conversely for Alpha Bank total assets rose
by 26.51The trend of almost all the other items in the balance sheet is
similar to total assets’, with the only exception being the variation of
total securities. Indeed, only 13 banks out of 30 in the sample decrease
the amount of total securities during the period 2010-2015.
• Loans: the trend of loans is consistent to total assets’. 22 banks out of
30 in the sample (most of which being Spanish banks - BBVA, Sabadell,
Santander, Bankinter, Caixabank - BNP, Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank)
decrease the amount of loans in the period 2010-2015, after a positive
increase for all of the banks during 2005-2010. The two critical years are
2012 and 2013, in which all the banks except Alpha Bank and Sabadell
decreased the amount of loans with an average manca qualcosa. Starting
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from 2014 all of the banks in the sample increased loans to customers
from the previous year. The share of loans on total assets show a positive
trend until 2012-2013, in which almost every bank in the sample (the
only exceptions being MPS, Credit Agricole, Deutsche Bank, ING, KBC
and Raiffeisen) lose on average 5 percentage points. However, there is not
a strong evidence of Business Model recomposition (the only exception
being Bankia that changes the share of loans on total assets from 68% in
2010 to 47% in 2013 – and 53% in 2015 – and the share of total securities
on total assets from 19% in 2010 to 39% in 2013 – and 36% in 2015).
• Total Securities: 15 banks decrease the amount of securities in 2011 and
all but 7 banks decrease it in 2013. There is a strong difference in 2015
among balance sheet items’ variation. Almost all of the banks decrease
the amount of securities after an increase in 2014. Contrariwise, the
variation of loans and fixed assets is positive for most of the banks.
• Deposits & Short term funding: as concerns liabilities, it is quite clear
that most of the banks substitute long term funding with short term
funding and equity. This is of course no surprise since, following the crisis,
regulators all over the world imposed banks higher capital requirements.
• Total Customer Deposits: we can further divide Deposits & Short term
funding in Total Customer Deposits and Deposits from Banks.
The first shows a positive trend during all the period of observation
except 2011, in which 20 out of 30 banks in the sample decrease the
amount of deposits by 10% on average. Moreover, in period 2010-2015
almost all the banks increase the amount of Total Customer Deposits
with an average value of 25%.
• Deposits from Banks: as concerns Deposits from Banks, we can note a
greater increase during 2010-2015 on average of 258%, that is the result
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of an increase of the amount of Deposits from banks made up by 17
banks out of 30.
• Long term funding: almost all the banks show a huge reduction in long
term funding (the only exception being ABN Amro, BNP Paribas and
Natixis) during 2010-2015 with an average of 40
The two most relevant outliers are Natixis and Raiffeisen. The first
one decrease its long term funding in 2005-2010 by more than 90% and
increase it in the following period by almost 200%. Conversely, Raiffeisen
strongly increase the amount of long term funding during 2005-2010 (by
more than 10 times) and decrease it in 2010-2015 by 50%. The latter
may be related in part to an increase in Raiffeisen’s total assets of more
than 200% during 2005-2010.
• Equity: all the banks in the sample (except Intesa Sanpaolo, KBC and
Ubi) increase the amount of equity during 2005-2015. However, if we
consider 2014 and 2015, all the 30 banks in the sample increase equity.
Spanish and Greek banks show a huge decrease in the amount of equity in
2013 with a peek of almost 500% registered by National Bank of Greece.
We can also note a strong increase in some of the observation that is due
to seasoned equity offerings occurred, with a total capital injection of €
2 billion, overall capital raised by the sample surge to almost +50% the
amount in and 2009 and remained strong in subsequent years.
• Common Equity: all the banks in the sample (except Intesa Sanpaolo
and Ubi) increase the amount of common equity by 150% on average
during 2005-2015, 2010 and 2015 being the years of the most relevant
increases.
• Impaired Loans (Memo) and Texas ratio:
A significant deterioration in loan portfolio quality also occurred Impaired
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Loans - Non Performing Loans (NPLs) of all the banks in the sample
registered an approximately tenfold rise in the period. Although there is
a quite constant increase during all the period of observation, the critical
years are 2008 and 2009, in which every bank in the sample register a
deterioration in loan portfolio by more than 100% on average.
This is obviously consistent with the trend of Texas ratio (Impaired
loans/Equity), which show a positive variation during 2005-2015 except
for Commerzbank and Credit Agricole. Nonetheless if we consider the
subperiod 2010-2015 the ratio is negative for the two above-mentioned
banks and also for Bank of Ireland, BNP, Deutsche Bank, Natixis and
Societe Generale, which are almost all investment banks.
• Memo: Total Weighted Risks (RWA): there is a negative variation of
Total Weighted Risks (RWA) for half of the banks during the period
2005-2015. However, there is a difference between the first sub-period
and the second one. In the first period all the banks except Bank of
Ireland increase the amount of Total Weighted Risks (RWA) (the two
most relevant increase are those of Greek banks - National Bank of
Greece, 117.84%; Alpha bank, 73.52%; and the German Commerzbank
-83.12%). Contrariwise, in the second sub-period there is a decrease of
the amount of Total Weighted Risks (RWA) for almost all the banks.
This consistent with the trend of the share of Total Weighted Risks
(RWA) on total assets that decrease in the second sub-period for almost
all the banks with an average of about 25%. The highest decreases occur
in 2012 and 2013.
• Total Interest Expense: the trend in Total Interest Expense is negative for
2005-2015 with 2009-2010 and 2013-2015 being the most critical periods.
In particular if we consider 2010-2015 all the banks except the Spanish
banks BBVA, Sabadell, Caixabank and Santander show a negative trend
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in Total Interest Expense with an average value of about 40%.
• Total Interest Income on Loans: this is obviously consistent with the
trend of Total Interest Income on Loans.
• Total Interest Expense on Customer Deposits: similarly, the trend of
Total Interest Expense on Customer Deposits is negative during the
period of observation and in particular in 2010-2015 (the only exceptions
being MPS, BBCA and Natixis).
• Net Interest Income: as a result, the amount of Net Interest Income
shows a quite positive variation during 2005-2015 (except for MPS, Banco
Commercial Portugues, KBC and Ubi) but there is a widely negative
trend during 2010-2015, in particular during 2012 and 2013.
• Net Fees and Commissions: the amount of Net Fees and Commissions
shows a quite negative trend in 2008-2009 and in 2011-2012 but it results
in a positive variation during 2005-2015 for most of the banks in the
sample with a peek of 273% by Raiffeisen.
• Operating Income (Memo): the variation of Operating Income is positive
during 2005-2015 but shows different trend in the two sub-periods with
the most critical year being 2011. This may be related to Overheads’
trend which is similar with Operating Income.
• Net Income: half of the banks considered in the sample show a negative
variation on Net Income during 2010-2015 with a peek of more than 650%
registered by National Bank of Greece. 2008-2009 and 2011-2012 are the
most critical years that show an overall average variation of -273% and
323% respectively.
• CET1: the trend of Common Equity Tier 1 is strongly positive over all
the period of observation for the entire sample of banks. The average
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increase is about 100% and the highest increases are those of Banco
Commercial Portugues and Bank of Ireland, equal to 199.58 and 184.67%
respectively.
This is obviously consistent with all of the other capital adequacy items
(Total capital ratio, Tier 1 ratio)
• Market To Book, Return on Equity (ROE) and Return On Assets (ROA):
both the market valuation of banks expressed by Market To Book ratio
and the banks’ profitability, measured by both Return on Assets (ROA)
and Return on Equity (ROE), halved during the period. However, the
trends of the variables are quite different.
The decrease of Market To Book ratio over 2006-2015 is the result of (i)
a negative variation during the period 2006-2010 for all the banks in the
sample (which in turn reflects the average 60% drop of the ratio in 2007);
and (ii) a positive variation in 2010-2015 (except for the Spanish banks
BBCA, Sabadell and Banco Popular Espanol) that was mostly achieved
in 2012 with the ratio starting to decrease again from 2014.
As concerns ROA and ROE, they show a negative variation during 2006-
2015 for almost all the banks in the sample (respectively except Bankinter,
Erste and KBC; and KBC) that is the result of a quite constant decrease
during each year. For some banks (quali) profitability starts to marginally
recover in 2014 while for others in 2015.
3.5.1 Cluster analysis
In order to classify banks by business model, we perform a cluster analysis.
This is an explorative methodology which identify homogenous groups
(clusters) not previously known by using data as input.
At a first stage, a factor analysis is needed in order to reduce the dimen-
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sions of observed data (number of variables) and minimize the multi-
collinearity effects.
After identifying clusters, we perform a discriminant analysis to check
the goodness of fit of the model (if the groups are statistically significant
and if the variables significantly discriminate between the groups) since
cluster analysis do not provide for robustness test and significance test.
As in Ayadi et al. (2011) and Roengpitya et al. (2014), we implement
the cluster analysis by using the Ward’s method (1963). The latter is
a hierarchical (or agglomerative) method, in which observed variables
start in their own separate cluster. The two most similar groups are then
combined repeatedly and then the sum of the squared distances within
each cluster is calculated. Cluster are finally chosen by identifying the
combination that gives the lowest sum of squares.
This first step of the methodology lead us to identify three different
homogenous groups ("clusters"), named as "Commercial banks", "Invest-
ment banks" and "Universal banks", which present specific types of bank
financial statements composition, as shown in Figure 3.3 and 3.4. Indeed,
the latters show respectively that (i) Commercial banks have most of
the Assets items composed of Loans, Investment and Universal of Other
earning assets; (ii) the ratio between Deposits & Short term funding over
Total Liabilities & Equity is quite similar for all the clusters - as well as
the ratio between Equity and Total Liabilities & Equity - but there is a
notable peek for Commercial banks, which still confirms that this group
of banks is more focused on the traditional banking intermediation.
3.5.2 Slicing and dicing the sample
This second step of the methodology involves in turn three steps:
1. investigate profitability and its drivers for banks in the sample;
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Figure 3.3. 2015 Business Model clusters: Assets items
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 3.4. 2015 Business Model clusters: Liabilities & Equity items
Authors’ own elaboration
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2. assess whether past profitability actually explains future profitability
and thus whether the emulation of best practices could actually
improve bank profitability;
3. examine to what extent all the above issues could be affected by
size, business models and country specifics.
There are many ways of identifying business models, all are to some
extent arbitrary, one possibility is to break down the sample in universal
banks, commercial banks and investment banks based on balance sheet
figures. Another option is to create clusters based on relevant similarities
(size, profitability, geographical presence). Both approaches are applied
in this paper, first we divide the sample based on profitability and then
we divide the sample using the breakdown proposed by Ötker-Rob e et
al. (2011).
3.6 Results
The list of variables provided in Table 3.4 are used to investigate the
sample’s balance sheet and statement of income data and key ratios
(respectively Figure 3.5, 3.9 and 3.10). Figure 3.6 sets out the evolution
over the period of total assets, loans to customers, securities and equity,
Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the recomposition of total assets and total
liabilities over the period.
A decline in total assets was registered by more than half of sample
banks (18) in the period of observation. Almost all, with the exception
of Natixis, decreased total assets in the second sub-period (2010-2015).
Natixis starting from 2006. The critical year is 2013, in which almost all
the banks reduced total assets (except for Alpha bank, BPER, Sabadell)
by more than 7.5% on average with a peak of 20.32% of Deutsche Bank.
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Table 3.4. List of variables and descriptive statistics
Authors’ own elaboration
Balance sheet
Variable Average Median Std. Dev.(%) Min MAX
Cash and Non-Earning Assets 43.518.038 15.841.000 133,10% 532.300 260.107.000
Loans and Advances to Banks 44.877.700 12.360.000 142,50% 832.700 363.655.000
Derivatives Assets 72.298.163 8.807.000 209,19% 62.800 1.224.493.000
Other Securities 112.793.455 40.443.000 136,81% 2.491.000 972.665.000
Loans 219.596.758 119.439.000 94,31% 22.954.200 758.505.000
Gross Loans 227.860.320 126.184.900 93,50% 23.203.900 785.022.000
Less: Reserves for Impaired
Loans/NPLs 8.263.562 5.048.000 107,50% - 47.955.300
Remaining earning assets 11.864.269 439.900 393,99% - 331.793.000
Fixed Assets 3.585.891 1.573.200 122,99% 235.000 21.593.000
Total Assets 508.534.273 210.006.300 111,54% 40.181.100 2.202.423.000
Deposits & Short term funding 264.107.573 141.810.500 101,71% 12.439.700 1.207.062.000
Total Customer Deposits 195.592.060 83.119.000 102,61% 3.966.600 695.116.000
Deposits from Banks 46.516.634 19.109.600 113,44% - 226.206.000
Other Deposits and Short-term
Borrowings 21.998.879 4.518.300 167,43% - 166.660.000
Other interest bearing liabilities 165.695.588 51.180.800 137,86% 2.045.400 1.477.714.000
Other (Non-Interest bearing) +
Loan Loss Reserves + Other Reserves 53.667.336 8.836.300 163,86% 816.200 377.925.000
Equity 25.063.777 12.669.900 100,17% -6.056.000 100.077.000
Total Liabilities and Equity 508.534.273 210.006.300 111,54% 40.181.100 2.202.423.000
Income Statement
Variable Average Median Std. Dev.(%) min MAX
Interest Income on Loans 10.299.837 5.035.000 105,44% - 56.803.000
Other Interest Income 5.572.166 1.736.000 147,71% - 53.574.000
Dividend Income 206.836 63.000 140,76% - 1.665.900
Gross Interest and Dividend Income 16.078.839 7.158.500 106,92% 1.217.100 68.604.000
Interest Expense on
Customer Deposits 3.269.983 1.212.600 137,34% - 22.048.000
Other Interest Expense 6.140.260 2.405.800 136,33% 56.500 50.002.000
Total Interest Expense 9.410.243 3.789.600 124,16% 353.700 55.797.000
Net Interest Income 6.668.596 3.264.000 105,37% 473.600 33.267.000
Net Gains (Losses) on
Trading and Derivatives 490.493 99.000 552,86% -33.818.000 10.539.000
Net Gains (Losses) on
Other Securities 345.797 88.500 393,90% -7.978.000 12.718.000
Net Gains (Losses) on Assets
at FV through Income Statement 279.294 - 675,34% -10.831.000 23.477.000
Net Insurance Income 19.957 - 8733,94% -7.276.000 7.447.000
Net Fees and Commissions 3.080.645 1.556.000 106,39% 192.000 12.765.000
Other Operating Income 228.890 55.200 341,24% -3.958.000 8.722.000
Total Non-Interest
Operating Income 4.445.076 1.819.900 118,78% -683.000 21.524.000
Equity-accounted
Profit/Loss – Operating 97.724 31.500 196,02% -485.300 915.000
Total Operating Income 11.211.396 5.456.400 103,87% 843.600 45.895.000
Personnel Expenses 3.805.384 2.143.800 105,06% - 16.061.000
Other Operating Expenses 2.606.125 1.411.700 164,85% -12.312.000 19.342.000
Total Non-Interest Expenses 6.411.509 3.248.900 110,01% - 32.635.000
Pre-Impairment Operating Profit 4.799.887 1.704.000 128,33% -5.754.000 24.188.000
Loan Impairment Charge 2.056.325 1.263.800 126,47% -34.000 18.523.000
Securities and Other Credit
Impairment Charges 269.510 41.400 261,73% -119.000 6.248.000
Operating Profit 2.474.051 631.000 223,40% -17.914.800 12.466.000
Equity-accounted
Profit/Loss - Non-operating 26.007 - 819,87% -900.000 2.558.000
Non-recurring Income 211.186 30.700 263,43% -3.982.000 4.777.900
Non-recurring Expense 426.115 19.600 289,33% -11.200 10.448.000
Change in Fair Value of Own Debt -9.671 - -2134,84% -1.717.000 1.190.000
Other Non-operating
Income and Expenses -17.684 - -3016,55% -3.355.000 2.910.000
Pre-tax Profit 2.257.774 818.000 248,19% -22.189.200 13.020.000
Tax expense 443.460 214.100 223,91% -2.996.600 3.856.000
Profit/Loss from
Discontinued Operations 33.259 - 1275,37% -4.320.000 3.987.000
Net Income 1.847.573 681.000 270,71% -19.192.600 9.636.200
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 3.5. Balance sheet aggregates
Authors’ own elaboration
Conversely for Alpha Bank total assets rose by 26.51%.
The drop in total assets reflects the contraction in loans shown by 22
banks out of 30 in the sample (especially by Spanish banks - BBVA,
Sabadell, Santander, Bankinter, Caixabank - BNP, Crédit Agricole,
Deutsche Bank) in the period 2010-2015, after a rise for all of the banks
during 2006-2010.
The two critical years are 2012 and 2013, in which all sample banks
except Alpha Bank and Sabadell decreased the amount of loans by an
average of 4.95%. Nonetheless, starting from 2014 all of the banks in the
sample increased loans to customers from the previous year.
Conversely, the majority of sample banks (18) increased total securities
(inclusive of derivatives) in the period 2010-2015.
Practically all the banks in the sample (except Intesa Sanpaolo and Ubi)
considerably expanded their common equity (with an average rise of
150% over the entire period) with 2010 and 2015 being the years of the
most relevant increases
Figure 3.9 sets out main statement of income aggregates in terms of total
assets and shows the considerable decline in net income expressed as
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Figure 3.6. Evolution of main balance sheet aggregates
Authors’ own elaboration on Bankscope data* (data include only banks with no
missing observations for 2006-2015. The figure excludes ABN Amro, Bankia and
Caixabank)
Figure 3.7. Evolution of asset composition of sample banks over the period
Authors’ own elaboration
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Figure 3.8. Evolution of liability composition of sample banks over the period
Authors’ own elaboration
a percentage of total assets which reflected a decrease in non interest
income and higher write-downs on loans whilst, despite the increasingly
challenging interest rate context, sample banks managed to maintain
their net interest margins at levels not far from the beginning of the
period.
Sample banks’ profitability, measured by both Return on Assets (ROA)
and Return on Equity (ROE), halved during the period, with contractions
from 2006 to 2015 for almost all the banks in the sample that is the result
of a continued downward trend. For some banks profitability starts to
marginally recover in 2014 while for others in 2015.
The decrease of Market To Book ratio over 2006-2015 is the result of (i)
a negative variation during the period 2006-2010 for all the banks in the
sample (which in turn reflects the average 60% drop of the ratio in 2007);
and (ii) a positive variation in 2010-2015 (except for the Spanish banks
BBCA, Sabadell and Banco Popular Espanol) that was mostly achieved
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Figure 3.9. Evolution of statement of income aggregates in percentage of total
assets
Authors’ own elaboration
Figure 3.10. Key ratios
Authors’ own elaboration
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in 2012 with the ratio starting to decrease again from 2014.
As expected, the most stable aggregates, measured in terms of percentage
standard deviation of observations, both across the sample and also
over the period are the various capital ratios that reflect regulatory
requirements Total capital ratio (30.31%), Tier 1 Ratio (33.33%), CET1
(37.93%) that for all sample banks increased in the period as a result of
higher capital ratios imposed by authorities.
Conversely and somewhat surprisingly, other ratios, more directly con-
nected to business models were actually even more stable across banks
and over the entire period: Net Interest Income/Total Operating In-
come (22.14%) and the cost/income ratio (26.39%) the Loans to deposits
(30.35%) and Risk weighted assets to total assets (44.31%).
The most profitable banks (measured both in terms of ROA and ROE)
in the ten year period vary considerably over time so slicing the model
based on profitability would have led to quite different results based on
the starting year and the profitability measure used. Conversely, size
and price/book ratios are far more stable.
Comparing profitability with risk shows that larger banks in our sample
tend to have higher and less volatile profitability. Low volatility is
also an ex post measure of sustainability. Sustainable profitability is
important for supervisors since it means that the bank has sufficient
income-generating capacity to enable it to maintain an adequate capital
base via retained earnings.
Figures 3.11 and 3.12 plot respectively the Average and Standard Devia-
tion of ROA, and the Average and Standard Deviation of ROE on our
sample of banks excluding Alpha Bank and Bankia, that are considered
outliers. Banks are clustered by size, using the 25th, 50th, 75th and
100th percentiles of Total Assets.
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Figure 3.11. ROA and Risk
Authors’ own elaboration, data include only banks with no outliers. The figure
excludes Alpha Bank and Bankia
Figure 3.12. ROE and Risk
Authors’ own elaboration, data include only banks with no outliers. The figure
excludes Alpha Bank and Bankia
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Based on this analysis, larger banks seem to be more profitable and at
the same time present lower volatility in their results.
We simulate the application of the business models approach proposed
by Ötker-Robe et al. (2011) to banks in the sample using 2006 data.
Figure 3.13. Balance sheet aggregates – breakdown by business model
Authors’ own elaboration
There are many ways of identifying business models, all are to some
extent arbitrary, one possibility is to break down the sample in universal
banks, commercial banks and investment banks based on balance sheet
figures. Another option is to create clusters based on relevant similarities
(size, profitability, geographical presence). Both approaches are applied in
this paper, first we divide the sample based on profitability and then we
divide the sample using the breakdown proposed by previous literature)
and the latter using first a breakdown based on return on equity and
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Figure 3.14. Key ratios – Commercial banks
Authors’ own elaboration
another based on capital adequacy.
The division by business models7 is actually rather constant over time.
In our classification we divide sample banks by business models based -
investment banks if loans are less than 15% of total assets or securities are
7Commercial banks: ABN Amro, Alpha Bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena,
Banca Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna, Banca Popolare di Milano, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya
Argentaria, Banco Comercial Portugues, Banco de Sabadell, Banco Popolare, Banco Popular
Espanol, Banco Santander, Bank of Ireland, Bankinter, Eurobank Ergasias, Unione di Banche
Italiane. Investment banks: BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Natixis, Sociètè Genèrale.
Universal banks: Bankia, Caixabank, Commerzbank, Crèdit Agricole, Erste Group, ING
Groep, Intesa Sanpaolo, KBC Groep, Mediobanca, Raiffeissen Bank International, Unicredit.
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Figure 3.15. Key ratios – Investment banks
Authors’ own elaboration
more than 60% of total assets, and as commercial banks if loans are more
than 60% of total assets or securities are less than 15% of total assets and
then, after these criteria are applied, all other banks are classified based
on judgment, taking into account the scope of derivatives activities, the
relative shares of securities and loans, and the share of trading income
in total revenue – based on the values of the two ratios at the start of
the period (2006). Though some differences in the three groups emerge
(Figure 3.13, 3.14, 3.15 and 3.16) and we find evidence that commercial
banks are and are likely to remain less profitable for as long as the ECB
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Figure 3.16. Key ratios – Universal banks
Authors’ own elaboration
official interest rates will remain very low or negative (Brogi et al., 2015),
it is striking that the standard deviation for each of the groups is actually
higher than for the entire sample. Moreover, practically same breakdown
by business model emerges by applying the ratios to all the years in the
period. This provides evidence for the fact that business models tend to
be viscous over time. The division by geographical area leads to similar,
somewhat discouraging, results.
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3.7 Conclusions
In this paper we slice and dice the results achieved by the Euro areas
top 30 listed banks in the period from 2006-2015. The most striking
similarities in banks in the sample seem to be actually related to their
business model, they have similar cost income ratios and are still all con-
siderably dependent on interest income for their profitability. Comparing
the 30 banks which make up the Eurostoxx Index, business models have
remained very stable in the period (the major exception being Bankia,
that changes the share of loans on total assets from 68% in 2010 to
47% in 2013 – and 53% in 2015 – and the share of total securities on
total assets from 19% in 2010 to 39% in 2013 – and 36% in 2015). All
banks rely quite significantly on Net Interest Income (almost 2/3 of Total
Income) and Loans to Customers are quite viscous.
Despite the progressive decrease in interest rates, sample banks managed
to maintain their net interest income margin, while total operating income
(inclusive of a more fluctuating non-interest income) dropped. However,
operating cost containment enabled to maintain stable cost/income ratios.
Lower profitability stemmed mainly from write-downs of loans. Size
seems to be as significant as business model in explaining performance
(measured both in terms of ROA and ROE). Moreover, based on this
analysis larger banks seem to be more profitable and at the same time
present lower volatility in their results.
The starting point of a business model analysis is the identification of
the more profitable players which are then investigated to assess the key
drivers for their profitability. However, our analysis does not lead to
clearly identify a consistent set of best performers over the period. In
other words, a BMA conducted starting on any one given year would
have led to chose banks which in subsequent years were no longer the
172
3. Are banks finding their feet?
Cluster analysis of banks’ business models
better performers, thus casting a shadow over the sustainability of their
prior superior performance and ultimately on their suitability as reference
points for other players.
These findings need to be further investigated but would suggest that
structural reforms such as ring-fencing commercial banking activities
would not necessarily lead to more stable banks but possibly to banks
which could be easier to resolve. Lastly, as concerns more specifically
BMA, it could be argued that in the period sample banks endeavoured
to pursue more attractive business models even without being nudged
by regulators, however it may have proved not to be so easy improve
profitability with or without a change in business models irrespective of
their potential wish to do so.
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